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“Quite possibly, by 2010 a map of the United States [Exclusive
Economic Zone] will look more like the plat of a subdivision than
a map of ocean space.”1
“Once private property rights in ocean waters are recognized, I am
uncertain where lines can be drawn.”2
Can a private party own ocean space?  Can a government sell,
transfer, or give away marine systems under its jurisdiction?
When a nation declares a marine-protected area or an exclusive
fishing zone, is it exercising rights as the proprietor of marine
systems or is it exercising regulatory authority?  What is the role
of government in regard to allocation of ocean resources?  These
are not simple questions, but they are critically important as the
demand for exclusive rights to ocean resources increases.  This
Article aims to articulate questions not yet explored in the litera-
ture and provide readers with the background to search for
answers.
The oil and gas industry has placed thousands of stationary and
floating platforms, pipelines, and related infrastructure in the
oceans.3  Other industries are now joining the offshore develop-
ment boom, adding wind, wave, and tidal-energy facilities; tuna
ranches; and liquid natural gas (LNG) terminals.4  To protect
1 James E. Bailey, III, Comment, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Its Development
and Future in International and Domestic Law , 45 LA. L. REV. 1269, 1296 (1985).
2 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 279 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
3 In the United States, the Minerals Management Service within the Department
of the Interior manages more than 8000 active leases on the 1.76 billion acres of the
outer continental shelf.  Most of these leases are within the Gulf of Mexico. U.S.
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND NATURAL
GAS RESOURCES: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 1, available at http://www.mms.gov/
ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) [hereinafter
LEASING OIL AND NATURAL GAS RESOURCES].
4 See PAUL W. PARFOMAK & AARON M. FLYNN, Cong. Research Serv., LIQUE-
FIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) IMPORT TERMINALS: SITING, SAFETY AND REGULATION
4 tbl.1 (2004).
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these offshore installations, and in some cases to prevent sabo-
tage or terrorism, these facilities require exclusion zones,5 effec-
tively closing an area to all vessel traffic including fishing and
recreational boating.  Simultaneously, U.S. foreign trade (much
of which is dependent on freedom of navigation, increased
container shipping, and expanded port facilities) is projected to
double in tonnage and quadruple in value by 2020.6  Once invest-
ments are made to install any of these new uses, investors may
come to expect protection of rights that have not existed previ-
ously.  It is easy to foresee a set of issues that defy resolution
under our existing legal and political system.
What system of rights and rules should be in place to authorize
offshore wind, tidal, and wave-energy facilities, or permit conver-
sion of oil and gas platforms to other uses?  In 2005, Congress
authorized the Department of the Interior’s Minerals Manage-
ment Service (MMS) to adopt regulations for offshore renewa-
ble-energy facilities and possible conversion of oil and gas
platforms.7  Congress is now considering bills to establish a regu-
latory structure that would encourage and authorize offshore
open-water aquaculture.8  Before the United States approves a
5 Federal regulations require specific zones around LNG terminals.  49 C.F.R.
§ 193.2057 (2006) (thermal exclusion zones); 49 C.F.R. § 193.2059 (flammable va-
por-gas dispersion zones).  The regulations incorporate and comply with National
Fire Protection Association standards. NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA: 59A: STAN-
DARD FOR THE PRODUCTION, STORAGE, AND HANDLING OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL
GAS (LNG) (1996). See PARFOMAK, supra  note 4, at 8.  An example of a safety
exclusion zone is found in the Draft Environmental Impact Report for Cabrillo Port
LNG Natural Gas Deepwater Port, which anticipates a safety exclusion zone around
each LNG carrier of 1000 yards ahead and 500 yards to the sides, and discusses
deliberate attacks. CAL. STATE LANDS COMM’N, REVISED DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT REPORT FOR THE CABRILLO PORT LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS DEEPWATER
PORT 4.2-25 (2006), available at  http://www.slc.ca.gov/Division_Pages/DEPM/
DEPM_Programs_and _Reports/BHP_DEIS-R.htm.
6 THE TRANSP. INST., PRESENT STATUS, http://www.trans-inst.org/1.html, (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2007).  For an overview of the importance of and trends in marine trans-
port, see U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: FINAL REPORT (2004) [hereinafter OCEAN BLUEPRINT], available at
http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_rpt/welcome.html#full.
7 Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 388(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).  For a discussion of
U.S. and international law regarding conversion of offshore rigs to artificial reefs,
see Rachael E. Salcido, Enduring Optimism: Examining the Rig-to-Reef Bargain , 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 863 (2005).
8 See , e.g ., National Offshore Aquaculture Act, S. 1195, 109th Cong. (2005).  On
June 8, 2006, the National Ocean Policy Study Subcommittee of the Senate Com-
merce, Science and Transportation Committee held hearings on the National Off-
shore Aquaculture Act of 2005. Offshore Aquaculture: Challenges of Fish-Farming
in Federal Waters: Hearing on S. 1195 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science
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new generation of stationary ocean and seabed uses, we should
have a clear understanding of the extent and limits of Congres-
sional authority in the oceans.  This Article examines the basis in
international and domestic law for allocating rights in the oceans.
It addresses the nature of property rights to, as well as authority
over, ocean space and marine resources essential to understand-
ing and developing new regimes for ocean governance.9
I begin with a look at how societal views and laws regarding
ocean space have changed from the sixteenth century to the pre-
sent.  New ocean discourses are likely to lead to new systems of
ocean governance to deal with new uses and conflicts arising over
ocean space.  Section II provides an overview of property rights.
Section III explains the distinction between imperium  and do-
minium  in international law, a distinction central to understand-
ing the seas as common property (in contrast to public or private
property).  Section IV brings international law to bear from the
Geneva Conventions of 1958, signing of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (1982 Convention), and
subsequent treatment of ocean space under international law.
Section V traces the evolution of property rights and the chang-
ing structure of sovereignty over the seas in U.S. court cases and
statutes including the nineteenth century battles over tidelands,
the 1945 Truman Proclamation unilaterally claiming an extension
of U.S. jurisdiction and control over the continental shelf, and a
series of cases from the 1940s to the present dealing with federal-
state conflicts over the oil and gas resources of the continental
shelf.  This section considers the nature of federal and state au-
thority over the seabed and subsurface, and explores in-depth the
assertions of property rights made by parties to these cases and
and Transportation , 109th Cong. (2006), available at  http://commerce.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=1770 (source not in
print as of publication).
9 A multidisciplinary, international group of marine ecologists, social scientists,
and ocean managers that convened at the National Center for Ecological Analysis
and Synthesis is articulating and developing the principles, concepts, and tools nec-
essary to move from fragmented, sector-by-sector governance of oceans to ecosys-
tem-based management through comprehensive ocean zoning.  The group discusses
ecosystem-based management in L.B. Crowder et al., Resolving Mismatches in U.S.
Ocean Governance, 313 SCI. 617 (2006).  The Working Group on Ocean Ecosystem-
Based Management: The Role of Zoning, met in March and November 2005 and
June 2006.  National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis, The Working
Group on Ocean Ecosystem-Based Management:  The Role of Zoning, http://www.
nceas.ucsb.edu/fmt/doc?https://admindb.nceas.ucsb.edu/admin/db/web.plist (last vis-
ited Feb. 15, 2007).
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rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court.  Section VI discusses pro-
tection of common property through contract law and the public
trust doctrine.  The final section offers recommendations for
ocean governance that reflect twenty-first century discourses on
the importance of marine ecosystems and ways to reduce and
manage conflicts as existing and new uses compete for ocean
space.
I
OCEAN DISCOURSES
Rights and rules are social constructs that reflect societies’ con-
ceptions at any point in history.  Philip Steinberg explores in-
depth the evolution of changing and conflicting discourses on the
sea in The Social Construction of the Ocean .10
What was once seen as a great void or wild, uncontrollable na-
ture has become what some envision as “a legitimate arena for
expressing and contesting social power.”11  Beginning with the
enclosure movement in the 1940s, coastal nations have extended
their authority to explore, extract, and govern ocean resources
from a three-mile territorial sea out to 200 miles or beyond.12
From the 1950s to the 1980s, coastal nations asserted unilateral
claims to extend their jurisdiction in the sea, arguably to achieve
more rapid and efficient development of oil and gas reserves as
well as fisheries off their coasts.13  Debates among nations pitted
coastal states against distant water-fishing nations, landlocked
states against coastal states, and maritime powers seeking free-
dom of movement against coastal states interested in capturing
and controlling increasingly valuable living and non-living ocean
and seabed resources.  Eventually, the 1982 United Nations Law
of the Sea treaty effected a massive “redistribution of wealth and
10 PHILIP E. STEINBERG, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE OCEAN (2001).
11 Id.  at 207-08.
12 ROSS D. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES (1979).
13 These debates are well documented in numerous sources. LAWRENCE JUDA,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OCEAN USE MANAGEMENT: THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN
GOVERNANCE 93-254 (H.D. Smith ed., 1996); ANN L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POL-
ICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 62-349 (1981); ROBERT L. FRIEDHEIM, NEGOTIATING
THE NEW OCEAN REGIME 18-26 (1993).
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income” through the “transfer . . . of two assets, hydrocarbons
and living resources, to the coastal state. . . .”14
In the twenty-first century, scientists are probing the deep seas,
discovering and naming new species.  While mining companies
sample the quality and quantity of minerals that might be ex-
tracted around deep-sea vents,15 scientists warn of the danger of
loss of species and genetic diversity from these unique and unex-
plored habitats.16  No longer are the oceans opaque to the human
view.  Underwater cameras allow aquarium visitors to watch
real-time undersea changes.17  Satellite tags enable researchers to
provide three-dimensional diagrams of the movement of tuna
and billfish over months or years,18 and listening devices reveal
the location and movement of marine mammals as well as identi-
fiable schools of fish.19  Science and technology have probed
ocean space and opened our eyes to new economic opportunities,
threats, and values.
Elliott Norse, a marine ecologist and President of the Marine
Conservation Biology Institute, has called for an end to “the
14 Giulio Pontecorvo, Division of the Spoils: Hydrocarbons and Living Resources ,
in THE NEW ORDER OF THE OCEANS: THE ADVENT OF A MANAGED ENVIRONMENT
17 (Giulio Pontecorvo ed., 1986).
15 Patric Hadenius, Technology in the (Ocean) Trenches , TECH. REV., May/June
2006, available at  http://www.technologyreview.com/read_article.aspx?id=16790&
ch=infotech.
16 See generally  Census of Marine Life, Extraordinary Life Found Around Deep-
Sea Gas Seeps  (NOV. 20, 2006), available at  http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/
2006-11/coml-elf112006.php# (discussing newly observed marine life near New Zea-
land).  For a discussion of the environmental concerns regarding mining of deep-sea
vents, see KRISTI BIRNEY ET AL., DONALD BREN SCH. OF ENVTL. SCI. & MGMT.,
UNIV. OF CAL., SANTA BARBARA, POTENTIAL DEEP-SEA MINING OF SEAFLOOR
MASSIVE SULFIDES: A CASE STUDY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA, (Spring 2006), availa-
ble at  www.bren.ucsb.edu/research/documents/VentsBrief.pdf.
17 See, e.g. , Skidaway Institute of Oceanography’s webcam at http://www.skio
.peachnet.edu/research/sabsoon/fishwatch/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2007); see also  Press
Release, Scripps Inst. of Oceanography, Univ. of Cal., San Diego, Deceptive New
Birch Aquarium Exhibit Explores Camouflage in the Sea (May 27, 2005), available
at  http://scrippsnews.ucsd.edu/article_detail.cfm?article_num=683.
18 See  Tuna Research and Conservation Center, Tag-A-Giant, www.tunaresearch.
org (last visited Jan. 31, 2007); see also  Randall Kochevar, Stanford Univ., Following
a Dream, and Tuna, with Electronic Tagging , Feb. 25, 2004, http://news-service.
stanford.edu/news/2004/february25/aaas-blocksr-225.html.
19 Environment News Service, Scientists Use Ocean Listening Curtains to Track
Tagged Animals , July 3, 2006, http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jul2006/2006-07-03-
01.asp; Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., VENTS Program: Acoustic Monitor-
ing, http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/vents/acoustics.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2007); see
also Juliet Eilperin, Technologies Change Insight Into the Seas, WASH. POST, Dec.
18, 2006, at A12 (providing a good overview of recent technological developments).
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range wars on the last frontier”20 and urged development of
ocean zoning to avoid the conflicts that are inevitable as mineral
companies, fishing enterprises, and the energy industry lay claim
to, carve up, and exploit marine resources.21  Production and
consumption sites are now expanding from land to sea, under-
mining earlier conceptions of the oceans as a void.  At the same
time, the increasing importance of the seas as unfettered trans-
port-space may blind us to the impact of shipping on water qual-
ity and lead us to discount the cost of diesel fuel’s carbon
emissions on the oceans and atmosphere.  In his concluding
chapter, Steinberg recapitulated the conflicts within capitalist dis-
courses as well as the conflicting discourse calling for stewardship
of the sea; he wrote:
[T]he postmodern era is beset by increasing contradictions in
capitalist spatiality and, more specifically, capitalist construc-
tions of ocean-space. The ocean is more important than ever
as transport-space, and so there is increasing pressure . . . to
make the ocean as friction-free a surface as possible.  At the
same time, however, the ocean increasingly is attractive as a
space of development, and soon for the first time there will
probably be opportunities for spatially fixed investments in
the deep sea.  Additionally, humanity has developed an un-
precedented capacity to transform the nature of the sea so that
it no longer provides the resources it once did, a phenomenon
that has led some to support a stewardship system whereby
the ocean is governed as a special space of nature.  As various
ocean uses and the contradictions among them intensify, and
as each of these constructions conflicts with the spaces of rep-
resentation being constructed by everyday actors outside the
imperative of capitalism’s dominant (and contradictory) spa-
tial practices, it seems likely that the oceans will become a site
for imagining and creating future social institutions and rela-
tions, for land as well as for sea.22
Together, these discourses are reshaping social institutions for
the sea.
Indeed, governments are in the process of restructuring the
rights and rules that govern ocean space.  Lawmakers are rapidly
adding to the number of marine reserves around coastal areas
20 Elliott A. Norse, Ending the Range Wars on the Last Frontier: Zoning the Sea ,
in MARINE CONSERVATION BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF MAINTAINING THE SEA’S
BIODIVERSITY 422 (Elliott A. Norse & Larry B. Crowder eds., 2005).
21 Id. at 432-37.
22 STEINBERG, supra  note 10, at 208-09.
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that are closed to any extractive use, including fishing.23  Discus-
sion and development of marine-protected areas is spreading
rapidly, and some nations are experimenting with marine spatial
planning as a way to reduce conflict, protect biodiversity and a
range of habitat types, enhance adaptive management, and shift
from species-by-species and sector-by-sector management to
ecosystem-based management.24  With proposals for marine-pro-
tected areas limiting and excluding fishing, economists are at-
tempting to calculate the value of marine ecosystem services.25
The U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans
Commission have called for new mechanisms of ocean manage-
ment and restructuring of agency responsibility.26  At the sub-
national level, states are following suit.  In 2004, California cre-
ated a high-level Ocean Protection Council comprised of the
heads of the State’s Resources Agency, Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and Lands Commission, along with members of the
23 Tundi Agardy, Global Trends in Marine Protected Areas in TRENDS AND FU-
TURE CHALLENGES FOR U.S. NATIONAL OCEAN AND COASTAL POLICY: PROCEED-
INGS 51, 51 (Biliana Cicin-Sain et al. eds., 1999) available at  http://
www.oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/natdia_pdf/8agardy.pdf.  There is a
huge discrepancy between the proportion of land included in some form of pro-
tected area (18% of total U.S. landmass) and of marine waters (0.1% of U.S. waters
within 200 nautical miles of shore).  Bradley W. Barr & James Lindholm, Conserva-
tion of the Sea: Using Lessons from the Land , 17 GEORGE WRIGHT FORUM 77, 77
(2000), available at  http://www.georgewright.org/173barr.pdf.  On June 15, 2006,
President George W. Bush established the largest protected ocean area in the world,
the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands Marine National Monument, covering 139,793
square miles of emergent and submerged lands and waters.  Proclamation No. 8031,
71 Fed. Reg. 36,443 (June 15, 2006).
24 See  MPA News, http://depts.washington.edu/mpanews/ (last visited Feb. 26,
2007); see also  F. Douvere et al., The Role of Marine Spatial Planning in Sea Use
Management: The Belgian Case, 31 MARINE POL’Y 182 (forthcoming March 2007);
Jon C. Day, Zoning—Lessons from the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park , 45 OCEAN
& COASTAL MGMT. 139, 141 (2002).
25 Judith T. Kildow, Director of the National Ocean Economics Program, and her
team are creating the first comprehensive assessment of the coastal and ocean econ-
omy. See  National Ocean Economics Program, http://noep.mbari.org/ (last visited
Jan. 31, 2007); see also JUDITH KILDOW & CHARLES S. COLGAN, NAT’L OCEAN
ECON. PROGRAM, CALIFORNIA’S OCEAN ECONOMY: REPORT TO THE RESOURCES
AGENCY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, (July 2005), available at  http://resources.ca.gov/
press_documents/CA_Ocean_Econ_Report.pdf (providing comprehensive informa-
tion on the economic role of California’s ocean resources).  The National Ocean
Economics Program aims to measure non-market values as well as market values of
the oceans.  Non-Market Valuation Studies, http://noep.mbari.org/nonmarket/NM-
main.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2007).
26 PEW OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE
FOR SEA CHANGE, at xi (2003), available at  http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/env_pew_
oceans_final_report.pdf.
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public, to improve the management of the state’s coastal wa-
ters.27  In 2006, New York enacted the Ocean and Great Lakes
Ecosystem Conservation Act, which created the New York
Ocean and Great Lakes Ecosystem Conservation Council and
charged it to “integrate and coordinate ecosystem-based manage-
ment with existing laws and programs,”28 focusing particularly on
the eastern Lake Ontario and Long Island Great South Bay
coastal ecosystems.  Throughout the world, countries and
subunits of national governments are recognizing the need to
reshape ocean governance and the nature of property rights in
the seas.
One approach to problems of overexploitation is privatization
of resources, and this solution is frequently promoted for marine
resources.29  For example, the National Center for Policy Analy-
sis, among others, recommends replacement of current regula-
tory (command-and-control) approaches to fishery management
with a system of property rights.30  The National Center for Pol-
icy Analysis argues that experimenting with innovative private
property approaches will re-orient incentives and help restore
fisheries.31  Its “Debate Central” website considers four types of
ownership of marine resources as a starting point:
• Allowing ownership of shore land that is covered with
water at high tide as a way of managing clams, mussels, and
oysters.
• Allowing ownership of parcels of the ocean floor, so that
individuals can create artificial reefs.
• Allowing individuals to “fence off” areas of the ocean as a
way of managing migratory fish.
• Creating tradable rights—Individual Transferable Quo-
tas—that entitle fishermen to a certain portion of the
catch.32
27 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 35600 (West 2004).
28 N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 14-0109(4) (McKinney 2006) (establishing the
council, § 14-0111(1) (defining the council’s purpose and focus).
29 See  Ro¨gnvaldur Hannesson, The Privatization of the Oceans , in EVOLVING
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES 25 (Donald R. Leal ed., 2005).
30 National Center for Policy Analysis, Progressive Environmentalism: A Pro-
Human, Pro-Science, Pro-Free Enterprise Agenda For Change (2001), http://
www.ncpa.org/studies/s162/s162d.html.
31 See id.
32 Affirmative Plan: Property Rights, www.debate-central.org (last visited July 22,
2005) (on file with author).  Debate Central is an online resource created and main-
tained by the National Center for Policy Analysis for high school students research-
ing the nationwide high school debate topic.
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Advocates of privatization sought to create private property in
oyster beds and submerged lands adjacent to the coast even
before the United States became an independent nation.33  And
today the non-profit Nature Conservancy, which has large hold-
ings of land, is acquiring private submerged parcels for the pur-
pose of restoration and conservation.34  While privatization of
marine resources offers some attractions as a way to restructure
economic incentives in order to induce users to conserve and
even restore fisheries, privatization assumes that the government
has ownership rights in the sea floor, water column, and ocean
resources sufficient to allow transfer of ownership to private indi-
viduals or groups.  The Nature Conservancy is studying sub-
merged lands policies in Oregon and Massachusetts including an
examination of a sample of leases and titles.35  A limited number
of parcels close to the coast are held privately or leased to private
owners and may well provide a new vehicle for private conserva-
tion ownership.36  In addition, some parcels have become public
property held by states and subject to the public trust.  Far more
prevalent is common ownership of the seabed, water column,
and marine resources: these are protected by the public trust
doctrine with the government acting as a fiduciary to protect the
ownership interests of the people.37
33 See BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY,
LAW AND ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY 58 (1998).
34 The Nature Conservancy acquired about 13,000 acres of submerged lands in
Long Island’s Great South Bay in 2002.  M. W. Beck et al., New Tools for Marine
Conservation: The Leasing and Ownership of Submerged Lands , 18 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1214, 1217 (2004).  It also holds either title or leases to submerged lands in
Galveston Bay, Texas; Puget Sound, Washington; and Peconic Bay, New York. Id.
35 The work is being done as part of a project funded by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s Coastal Services Center.  E-mail from Michael Beck,
The Nature Conservancy, to author (Jan. 10, 2007) (on file with author).
36 Where the government granted rights to submerged lands to private owners,
the grants were to further public purposes (in transportation, movement of goods, or
other essential services). The government transferred substantial tidelands and sub-
merged lands in bays and estuaries to private owners early in this country’s history
to provide for railroads and wharves, seen as essential to foster commerce and well-
being for a growing nation.  Lands transferred into private ownership after any state
entered the union are protected by the public trust doctrine, which may well require
different treatment to serve different public needs today.  These protections may be
sufficient to restrict a private owner’s use of those submerged lands today and pre-
vent the charge that government action restricting use for conservation is an unlaw-
ful “taking.”
37 For an overview of the public trust doctrine, see DONNA R. CHRISTIE & RICH-
ARD G. HILDRETH, COASTAL AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT LAW IN A NUT SHELL 19-
31 (2nd ed. 1999); see also  discussion infra  Part VI.
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II
A PRIMER ON PROPERTY RIGHTS
Property rights are the entitlements of ownership, to which we
may add the obligations of ownership.  Ownership of property
generally falls into one of four broad categories:  private, public,
common, and nul property.
FIGURE 1:  PATTERNS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
PRIVATE PROPERTY:  Bundle of rights belongs to identifiable owner
(individual or legal person such as a corporation).
PUBLIC PROPERTY:  Bundle of rights belongs to the federal government
or the state government.
COMMON PROPERTY:  Bundle of rights belongs to a group of people.
Community property is a subset of common property in which an
identifiable community or group of owners make collective decisions
regarding the property.
NUL PROPERTY:  In effect, the bundles are more or less empty in the
sense that anything goes, but note that truly empty sets are pretty rare.
An absence of well-defined use rights.
Nul property, with access open to all (though often confused with
common property), seldom occurs in practice today.38  Histori-
cally, areas now treated as common property, including the ex-
clusive economic zone (EEZ) and high seas, were nul property.
However, as the need for rules of access and use arose, nul forms
of property have given way to other property systems.  Property
rights to the oceans differ from property rights to land.39  On
land, the government often owns extensive areas as public prop-
erty, but the law is quite different with regard to navigable waters
and submerged lands.  Under English common law, the king held
38 “Nul” is short for res nullius ,  which is Latin for “thing of no one.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (7th ed. 1999); see generally  Seth Macinko & Daniel W.
Bromley, Property and Fisheries for the Twenty-First Century: Seeking Coherence
from Legal and Economic Doctrine , 28 VT. L. REV. 623, 646-47 (2004) (highlighting
the problem with conflating open-access resources and common-property regimes).
39 Oran R. Young, Institutional Interplay: The Environmental Consequences of
Cross-Scale Interactions , in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 263, 267-73 (Elinor Os-
trom et al. eds., 2001) (exploring the differences between sea tenure and land ten-
ure) (“[T]here is little history of private property and only limited experience with
public property in the ordinary or normal sense of the term when it comes to the
management of human uses of marine resources.”). Id.  at 271.
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shores, bays, rivers, arms of the sea, and the land under them as a
public trust for the benefit of the whole community.40  These ar-
eas were part of the commons.  U.S. courts based their develop-
ment of the public trust doctrine on English common law; thus
submerged lands, waters, and marine resources are not public
property owned by the state, but are referred to as public trust
lands, public trust waters, and public trust resources.41  The gov-
ernment is not the owner, but the trustee on behalf of the people.
Public trust property is more properly categorized as common
property, though in the U.S. legal system such property is fre-
quently identified as a particular type of public property:
Public trust lands are special in nature. . . . Because of the
“public” nature of trust lands, the title to them is not a singular
title in the manner of most other real estate titles.  Rather,
public trust land is vested with two titles: the jus publicum , the
public’s right to use and enjoy trust lands and waters for com-
merce, navigation, fishing, bathing and other related public
purposes, and the jus privatum , or the private proprietary
rights in the use and possession of trust lands.42
While the king (and the American colonies and, later, the states)
could convey the jus privatum  part of the title to a private owner,
the jus publicum remained dominant and could not be
conveyed.43
Under international law, title to or ownership of the oceans
belongs to a wider community: oceans and their resources have
been treated as common property.  Now this concept, long ac-
cepted in international law, is being challenged.
From the time that Dutchman Hugo Grotius’ seventeenth-cen-
tury view of international law of the oceans took hold, the oceans
beyond the territorial sea have been regarded as common prop-
erty, res communis  (global commons outside of national jurisdic-
tion).44  Although often inaccurately labeled res nullius  (open
40 See generally  Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention , 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (seminal article reviving
the public trust concept).
41 Id.
42 DAVID C. SLADE, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK: THE AP-
PLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS, WA-
TERS AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL STATES 1 (1990).
43 Id.  at xviii-xix, 13; see also id.  at xxxix (containing definitions of jus privatum
and jus publicum).
44 See JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 309 (2d ed. 2002).
Grotius’ seminal text Mare Liberum , penned in 1609, argued for open seas, a con-
cept that would benefit Dutch trading interests. Id. See generally HUGO GROTIUS,
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access), the Grotian order of the oceans embodies the concept of
communal ownership with nation-states as the members of the
community who set the rules.45  The Dutch, as a growing com-
mercial sea-power, needed freedom of movement on the seas.
At the time, Spain and Portugal each envisioned controlling large
parts of the oceans, but they had neither the technology to police
their claims nor the consent of other nations.46  The fact that
many resources, such as fish, remained unrestricted and available
to all reflected the view of member nations that rules and restric-
tions were not necessary for such abundant, even inexhaustible,
resources.47  With the post-World War II enclosure movement,
nations claimed increased sovereignty as well as exclusive use
and control rights over the oceans.48
In line with prominent economic thinking, policymakers in the
1960s and 1970s found the argument for conversion of communal
land to private property (or to public property) appealing.  Con-
version has been viewed by Harold Demsetz and others as a way
to avoid economic waste and inefficiency or to better internalize
benefits and costs.49  Transformation of communal rights to more
exclusive forms of property rights occurs, Demsetz argued, when
the benefits of efficiency outweigh the costs of conversion.50
Ross Eckert, applying Demsetz’s theories to the oceans to under-
stand the enclosure movement that began with the Truman Dec-
laration of 1945, argued:
[T]he process of conversion to more exclusive ocean resource
rights, either through enclosure or [the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea], is only a first step for remov-
ing the inefficiencies that result from communal rights.  The
THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: OR, THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO
TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE (James Brown Scott ed., Ralph Van
Deman Magoffin trans., Oxford University Press 1916) (a collection of Grotius’ dis-
sertations translated from Latin).
45 See generally GROTIUS, supra  note 44 (arguing that no one country can monop-
olize control of the seas).
46 Robert L. Friedheim, Managing the Second Phase of Enclosure , 17 OCEAN AND
COASTAL MGMT. 217, 220 (1992).
47 See infra  Part IV.A.
48 OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra  note 6, at 49.
49 See  Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights , 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 354 (1967).
50 Id.  at 355.  For a more nuanced discussion of the drivers of privatization that
incorporate the political dimensions, see Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish:
Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property , 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (April
2005).
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second step is for authorities to assign exclusive and transfera-
ble private property rights to individuals, firms, or other enti-
ties that will ultimately exploit the resources.51
While coastal nations succeeded in asserting exclusive rights to
control and regulate resources 200 miles beyond land,52 the
privatization that Eckert anticipated did not occur.  For the most
part the oceans, and even the seabed and subsurface over which
coastal nations exert substantial control, are neither privately nor
publicly owned.  Nonetheless, the United States and other
coastal nations have used sovereign rights and authority to be-
have much as a proprietor would with regard to the seabed and
subsurface on the continental shelf.53  The Supreme Court and
Congress have on occasion blurred the distinction between sov-
ereignty (authority) and ownership (property rights).  So it is not
surprising that policymakers, news reporters, scientists, resource
managers, and the general public find it difficult to understand
the limited nature of ownership or property rights in the sea
today.54
In the United States, where federal public property exists on
land (whether as a national park, forest, petroleum reserve, or
military base), the Property Clause of the Constitution allows
Congress not only to manage that land, but also to dispose of it.55
If the seas were purely public property, then it would follow that
Congress could also convert the seas to private property.  But the
oceans, seabed, subsurface, and living resources are common
property subject to the public trust responsibility of the govern-
ment or governments that exercise regulatory authority over
them.  In the United States, various federal agencies exercise reg-
ulatory authority under the Commerce Clause over navigable
waters, submerged lands, and the resources of the sea.
51 ECKERT, supra note 12, at 16.
52 See  discussion infra  Part IV and accompanying footnotes.
53 The separation between communal, private, and state ownership, while useful
in their ideal or simplified forms for theoretical examination, is less clear in practice.
54 The literature on conservation of marine areas is replete with misconceptions
and erroneous statements regarding the nature of property rights in the sea.  The
most common error is to state that seas are “publicly owned.”  For an example, see
Barr & Lindholm, supra note 23, at 79.  The authors make this error, then in the
next sentence contradict this characterization of public ownership with the state-
ment that “all the waters of the EEZ (with a very few riparian exceptions) are
owned in common by the people.”  As this Article points out, public property is not
synonymous with common property.
55 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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The ocean enclosure movement56 as embodied in the 1982
Convention and in custom, has granted increased sovereign
rights and exclusive rights; coastal states have exercised these
rights to behave as proprietors over the seabed and subsurface
within 200 miles from shore.  Governments grant long-term
leases to private industry to explore and exploit oil and gas, and
charge use fees, rents, and royalties for access and extraction.
But, as I will explain later, the Law of the Sea Convention and
customary international law may have reduced the common own-
ers from a global community to citizens of particular states, but
they did not change the fundamental nature of ownership from
common property to public property.  Robert Friedheim, an in-
ternational-relations scholar, characterized the EEZ as a “na-
tional common, since the USA has not been willing, or perhaps
able, to allocate resources among domestic users, even if the en-
closing measures have eliminated or effectively controlled for-
eign users.”57
Lawyers often use the metaphor of a bundle of sticks to ex-
plain property rights.  The various “sticks” or rights that make up
the bundles generally fall into four categories: possession, use,
exclusion, and disposition, as shown in Figure 2.
56 JUDA, supra  note 13, at 226, 249 n.100; see also  Lewis Alexander, The Ocean
Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect , 20 S.D. L. REV. 561-94 (1983)
(describing the ocean enclosure movement as “creeping jurisdiction”).
57 Friedheim, supra  note 46, at 229.  Friedheim explains that states have not been
able to “treat their ocean territory as they have treated their land territory.” Id.  at
218.  States have granted only limited private rights because of the numerous possi-
ble claimants or interests who “wish to use the area simultaneously.” Id.  at 229.  “A
first step [to allocation among all of these claimants] would be to recognize that the
ocean, because of its joint supply or indivisibility, must always belong to all.” Id.  at
230.
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FIGURE 2: CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS58
Types of Rights Characteristics Examples
Possessory Right to keep, reinvest or Collects rents, royalties from
(proprietary) apportion the value; owner lessee
is exposed to liability for
damages caused by property
to others’ interests and may
collect for harm or damage
to the property by others
Use Rights to use for specific Fishing rights, oil and gas
(usually limited) purposes, exploration and extraction
at specified times and places rights, rights to use area for
aquaculture or tuna ranching
Exclusionary Right to exclude others Exclusive right to explore
from the property and exploit; demarcation of
safety zones from which
outsiders are excluded
Disposition Right to transfer, sell, Individual transferable
exchange fishing license; right to sell
oil and gas lease tract
A full set of possessory rights to marine areas would entitle the
owner to keep, reinvest, or apportion the value that accrues to
the property and would expose the owner to risk of loss in
value.59  Possessory rights entitle the holder to collect for dam-
ages to the property (compensation for damage to resources or
unlawful destruction of property) and expose the owner to liabil-
ity for damage caused by the property (e.g., from a blown-out oil
well or from the spread of invasive aquatic species).60  Use (usu-
fructuary) rights entitle the holder to use a particular property
for specific (usually limited) purposes (such as extraction of oil,
gas, or minerals; agriculture; aquaculture; and fishing).61  Use
rights may be limited to a particular time (five-year lease or sea-
sonal fishing license).  Exclusionary rights entitle the holder to
exclude others from using or trespassing on the property, and set
conditions for others to use the property.62  Disposition rights en-
58 Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Common Pools: Solving Problems Arising in
Human/Environment Relations , NAT. RES. L. J. (forthcoming 2007); Gail
Osherenko, Property Rights and Transformation in Russia: Institutional Change in
the Far North , 47 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1077, 1086-87 (1995).
59 See  Osherenko, supra  note 58, at 1086-87.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-2\OEL202.txt unknown Seq: 17 30-APR-07 9:25
2006] New Discourses on Ocean Governance 333
title the holder to dispose of, or in legal terminology, “alienate”
the property.63
From the sixteenth century to the latter part of the twentieth
century, people thought about sovereignty in terms of freedom of
navigation and expanded commerce.  Industry did not want to
privatize or carve up the seas.  Grotius, of the Netherlands, fa-
thered the concept of innocent passage through territorial seas as
a way to foster commerce while recognizing state sovereignty.64
The alternative was a Seldenian regime with the oceans divided
into national jurisdictions, based on the views of British lawyer
John Selden.65
While Grotius’ view prevailed, nations have dramatically ex-
panded their claims to the right to manage and control the use of
the seas.  First their claims expanded from a three- to a twelve-
mile territorial sea, then to extended rights to contiguous zones,
to the continental shelf, and finally EEZs 200 nautical miles from
the coastline.66  But nations have avoided overt claims of state
ownership or property rights to the seas.  The 1982 Convention
and U.S. legislation provide for state control and management of
offshore exploration and exploitation of subsea resources, but
they are generally silent on the nature of property rights to
marine resources.  Despite relentless pressure to make valuable
seabed and subsurface mineral resources available to industry,
the 1982 Convention does not address the subject of property
rights, instead focusing on jurisdiction.  Treaties and U.S. legisla-
tion generally avoid addressing property rights head-on, prefer-
63 Id.
64 See generally JUDA, supra  note 13, 8-30 (discussing the changing perceptions of
the sea during Grotius’ time).
65 See JOHN SELDEN, OF THE DOMINION, OR, OWNERSHIP OF THE SEA (Leonard
Silk advisory ed., Arno Press 1972) (1652).
66 Seaward of the territorial sea, international law recognizes a contiguous zone
over which nations may assert limited authority related to customs, fiscal, immigra-
tion, and sanitary laws. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra  note 6, at 72.  President Clinton
extended the U.S. contiguous zone from twelve to twenty-four miles offshore in
1999 to expand U.S. enforcement authority over foreign-flag vessels.  Proclamation
No. 7219, 64 Fed. Reg. 48,701 (Aug. 2, 1999).  The legal definition of “continental
shelf” under the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) now
overlaps geographically with EEZ, even where the continental margin does not ex-
tend that far from shore.  OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra  note 6, at 73.  This Article does
not explore the basis for claims of extension of rights to the continental shelf where
it extends beyond 200 nautical miles.  For in-depth discussions on the UNCLOS ne-
gotiations regarding the extent of offshore jurisdiction, see KALO ET AL., supra  note
44, at 317-18; and HOLLICK, supra  note 13, at 284-349.
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ring to skirt an issue that squarely raises questions of equity, and
pits haves against have-nots.
III
IMPERIUM VERSUS DOMINIUM
International law makes a clear distinction between imperium
(exercise of authority) and dominium  (property rights), and this
fundamental distinction matters in a time of increased claims to
ocean space for offshore industrial facilities, marine-protected ar-
eas, exclusive fishing zones, and expanded shipping.  While on
land, governments have both imperium  and dominium , the law is
quite different with regard to the seas.  Both scholarly and lay
literatures frequently fail to distinguish between imperium  and
dominium , thus eroding the distinction between the exercise of
authority and the entitlements of ownership.  Before states issue
permits for wind farms, aquaculture, and other new uses of
oceans, they need to be clear about their limited rights as sover-
eign nations to grant property rights in the sea, as well as about
the limited nature of rights that can be granted by lease.  The
important distinction between sea- and land-tenure systems re-
quires governments to exercise caution before enlarging the bun-
dle of property rights held by either public or private entities
over the seabed, water column, and ocean resources because
these are common property, not state-owned property.  The role
of the state is that of a trustee on behalf of the public.
While examining the nature of expanded nation-state sover-
eignty over plant and animal genetic resources in the 1990s and
over EEZs in the seas with the 1982 Convention, international
law expert Peter H. Sand wrote: “The message is simple: [t]he
sovereign rights of nation states over certain environmental re-
sources are not proprietary, but fiduciary .”67  Underpinning in-
ternational law is the separation of property rights from
sovereignty and the understanding that international law may, by
agreement among sovereign nations, extend rights of sovereignty
to groups of states, but this does not simultaneously grant prop-
erty rights.  Sand correctly characterizes the expanded role of the
state over environmental resources as that of a fiduciary (trustee)
rather than a proprietor (owner).  The public trust doctrine pro-
67 Peter H. Sand, Sovereignty Bounded: Public Trusteeship for Common Pool Re-
sources?, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 47, 48 (2004).
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tects the public’s interest in resources that are common property,
such as tidelands and submerged lands.  I will return to discuss
this fiduciary duty and its relationship to the public trust doctrine
in Part VI of this Article.
The U.S. Department of the Interior has paid close attention
to the distinction between the government’s exercise of authority
under the Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.68
Under the Property Clause, Congress has authority both “to dis-
pose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States. . . .”69  Under the Commerce Clause, the federal govern-
ment may make rules and regulations that affect use, exclusion,
and management, but it may not alienate what it does not own.
Thus, the federal government exercises imperium  (authority)
over the seas from 3 to 200 nautical miles,  but cannot legiti-
mately privatize ocean space over which it does not have domin-
ium .70  The right of the federal government to exercise authority
must be clearly separated from any mistaken concept of property
ownership in order to avoid endless battles among entrenched
private interests, the government, and rights of the public to
common property and common property resources.71
68 See generally  General Regulations for Areas Administered by the National
Park Service and National Park System Units in Alaska, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,133-01 (July
5, 1996) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 13) (clarifying authority to regulate navigable
waters located within park boundaries irrespective of ownership of submerged lands.
In some park areas, the United States holds title to the submerged lands
under navigable waters.  In other park areas, the United States does not
hold title to the submerged lands beneath navigable waters within the
boundaries of the park; federal authority to regulate within the ordinary
reach of these waters is based on the Commerce and Property clauses of
the U.S. Constitution, not ownership.  Like the United States Coast Guard,
the National Park Service exercises authority over navigable waters irre-
spective of ownership of submerged lands.
Additionally, the Park Service makes rules regarding private in-holdings (parcels
owned by private individuals or entities) within the boundaries of a national park,
but it may not use the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution as authority over
private in-holdings.). See id.  at 35, 134.
69 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
70 For an overview of jurisdiction on the oceans, see OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra
note 6, at 70-73.
71 Once land does become private, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution protect private property rights from being taken by government
without just compensation and due process.  The government’s regulatory power is
then limited in order to prevent unconstitutional deprivations of all economic use of
the land, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council , 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992), as well as regula-
tions that reduce the economic value where the government fails to show a sufficient
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IV
OWNERSHIP AND OCEAN SPACE UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In this section, I will discuss the key United Nations conven-
tions relevant to understanding the sovereign rights of nations in
the sea.  International law deals with sovereignty, so the dis-
course among nations divides and allocates jurisdiction or au-
thority, not property rights.
A. 1958 Geneva Conventions
Prior to the 1982 Convention,72 traditional freedoms of the
high seas limited resource interests and rights of the coastal
states.  While the seas were ostensibly open to all, the sovereign
rights of individual nations, coastal or landlocked, were limited.
States exercised neither imperium  nor dominium  over the high
seas.  Social groups or small communities, however, did exercise
rights to use certain areas of the sea and sometimes effectively
excluded competing users.73
Three of the four conventions adopted at the First United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in Geneva
in 1958 codified generally accepted customary law of the sea.74
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone75 affirmed the sovereignty of coastal nations over internal
waters, including ocean bays and a territorial sea subject to the
nexus between the public purpose and the regulation that restricts the owner’s bun-
dle of rights, Nolan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
72 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.  The treaty entered into force Nov. 16, 1994, and is ratified by 153
countries and the European Union, not  including the United States. Id.  at 397-98.
73 Sea-tenure rights often were extensions of landholdings, but might be demar-
cated by physical features such as patch reefs, reef holes, and reef passages.  Donald
M. Schug, The Revival of Territorial Use Rights in Pacific Island Inshore Fisheries in
OCEAN YEARBOOK 12, at 235, 236 (Elisabeth Mann Borgese et al. eds., 1996); see
also JAMES M. ACHESON, CAPTURING THE COMMONS: DEVISING INSTITUTIONS TO
MANAGE THE MAINE LOBSTER INDUSTRY 24-35 (2003) (describing how “harbor
gangs” in Maine effectively control local lobster-fishing territories); but see  E. Paul
Durrenberger & Gisli Palsson, Ownership at Sea: Fishing Territories and Access to
Sea Resources , 14 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 508, 509 (1987) (discussing inshore rights to
resources as an extension of the territorial hunting-and-gathering model on land).
74 See JUDA, supra  note 13, at 157-59.
75 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 206.  The treaty entered into force Sept. 10, 1964, and is ratified
by fifty-one countries including the United States. Id.  at 206.
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right of innocent passage for foreign-flag vessels.76  While the ex-
tent of the territorial sea is not specified in the Convention on
the Territorial Sea, coastal states were allowed to exercise juris-
diction to implement and enforce customs, fiscal, immigration,
and sanitary laws in a contiguous zone extending nine miles be-
yond the traditional three-mile territorial sea.  The Convention
on the Continental Shelf confirmed coastal states’ “sovereign
rights” to explore and exploit the natural resources of the conti-
nental shelf.77  The Convention on the High Seas78 codified the
freedom of navigation (on the surface and submerged), the free-
dom to fish, the freedom of overflight, and the freedom to lay
cables and pipelines on the sea floor in the area beyond the terri-
torial sea.79
The fourth convention, the Convention on Fishing and Conser-
vation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,80 allowed
coastal nations to set nondiscriminatory conservation rules re-
garding fishing for threatened stocks in the high seas beyond
their territorial seas.81  Although the Treaty was adopted and rat-
ified by a sufficient number of nations to enter into force, the
major distant water-fishing nations did not join or observe the
regulations set by member countries.82  What is important about
the Geneva conventions for our purposes is that the area beyond
the territorial sea remained high seas.  Coastal nations gained
rights to assert increased imperium  (authority or control) but not
dominium  (ownership).
76 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile claimed natural
resources out to 200 miles. See KALO ET AL., supra  note 44, at 312-15.  As the “200-
mile Club” grew, a group of international law experts formed within the United
Nations system and drafted the four draft treaties proposed at UNCLOS I. Id.  at
313.
77 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 419 U.N.T.S. 312,
312.  The treaty entered into force June 10, 1964, and is ratified by fifty-eight coun-
tries including the United States. Id.
78 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 12.  The
treaty entered into force Sept. 30, 1962, and is ratified by sixty-three countries in-
cluding the United States. Id.
79 Id.  at 82-84.
80 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 286.  The treaty entered into force March
20, 1966, and is ratified by thirty-eight countries including the United States. Id.  at
286.
81 See JUDA, supra  note 13, at 159-60.
82 Id.  at 150, 196 n.2.
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Even the Convention on the Continental Shelf makes no men-
tion of property rights, dominion or dominium , and only grants
coastal states “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring [the
continental shelf] and exploiting its natural resources.”83  The
rights are exclusive, so that if the coastal state does not explore
or exploit the natural resources of its continental shelf, no one
else may do so without express consent of the coastal state.84
While the Convention does not consider the continental shelf to
be the territory of the coastal state, the coastal state has use
rights and exclusionary rights.85  Furthermore, the state may ex-
ercise, and many states have exercised, possessory rights over the
continental shelf by collecting rents and royalties for oil, gas, and
other minerals extracted from the continental shelf, as well as
from bonus bids when conducting lease sales.  States behave as
though they own an extensive bundle of property rights in the
continental shelf, with the exception of full disposition or aliena-
tion.  Notably, the United States has neither sold the continental
shelf outright to private interests nor transferred fee title.  Leases
are limited to the life of the oil or gas field, many environmental
and safety conditions apply, and contracts require removal of all
equipment from the site at the conclusion of the lease term.86
In the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Article 3 specifies
that the coastal states’ rights “do not affect the legal status of the
superjacent waters as high seas.”87  But Article 5 allows the
coastal state “to construct and maintain or operate on the conti-
nental shelf installations and other devices necessary for its ex-
ploration and the exploitation of its natural resources, and to
establish safety zones . . . to a distance of 500 metres around the
installations and other devices which have been erected. . . .”88
The Convention is careful to ensure that the installations are not
83 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra  note 77, 419 U.N.T.S. at
312.
84 Id.
85 See id.  at 312-13.
86 See  43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006) (“The Secretary may . . . prescribe . . . rules . . .
for the prevention of waste and conservation of the natural resources of the outer
Continental Shelf.”); see also LEASING OIL AND NATURAL RESOURCES, supra  note
3, at 40 (“When a field can no longer be economically produced and the lease ex-
pires, the lessee, with the MMS approval, must plug and abandon all wells and re-
move all equipment from the lease, including the platform and any subsea
devices.”).
87 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra  note 77, 419 U.N.T.S. at
313.
88 Id.at 314.
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considered territory of the coastal state.  The installations “do
not possess the status of islands.  They have no territorial sea of
their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of
the territorial sea of the coastal State.”89
B. 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea
The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III) began in 1973 and culminated in adoption of the comprehen-
sive 1982 Convention.90  Two Implementation Agreements fol-
lowed:  Part XI (Seabed) in 199491 and Fish Stocks in 1995.92
Negotiators in Committee Four of UNCLOS III debated the
functional content of the continental shelf regime to be included
in what became Article 68 of the 1982 Convention.93  One issue
was the meaning of “sovereign rights” for the purpose of explor-
ing and exploiting the natural resources.94  Latin American na-
tions wanted the term replaced with “sovereignty,” while
Germany preferred “rights.”95  The United States at one point
proposed “exclusive rights.”96  Article 56(1)(a) of the 1982 Con-
vention retained the “sovereign rights” terminology of the 1958
Convention; in the EEZ a coastal State has:
[S]overeign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living
or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of
the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities
for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
89 Id.
90 See JUDA, supra  note 13, at 212-43.  The first U.N. Conference on the Law of
the Sea began in 1958. Id.  at 138.  At the second conference in 1960, nations came
close to agreeing on a Convention on the Territorial Sea. See id.  at 160-62.
91 Id.  at 256; see also  Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 42.
The treaty entered into force on November 16, 1994. Id.  at 43.
92 JUDA, supra  note 13, at 284; see also  Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, Dec. 10, 1982, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3.  The Treaty entered into force December 11,
2001, ratified by sixty-four countries including the United States and the European
Union.
93 HOLLICK, supra  note 13, at 150-51.
94 Id.  at 151.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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such as the production of energy from the water, currents and
winds.97
Article 56(1)(b) of the 1982 Convention grants coastal states ju-
risdiction in the EEZ over artificial islands and offshore installa-
tions and structures, marine scientific research, and marine
environmental protection and preservation.98  The 1982 Conven-
tion provisions regarding the EEZ do not confer dominium  (a
property right) in the seabed, the water column, or ocean re-
sources, but they allocate considerable jurisdiction and control to
coastal states.
If the signatories intended to convert common property to
public property, rather than merely to extend authority to coastal
states to manage and control common property in the sea under
a new set of rules, the language of the 1982 Convention would
have made this vital distinction clear.  The grant of sovereign
rights to coastal states “for the purpose of exploring and exploit-
ing . . . resources”99 allows coastal states to exercise increased
imperium  over the EEZ.  In other words, coastal states have the
right to manage the EEZ on behalf of the people, the common
property owners.
The exercise of sovereign rights “for the purpose of . . . con-
serving and managing the natural resources”100 requires only the
authority or the ability to make rules.101  Exploring, exploiting,
and activities such as production of energy, however, usually re-
97 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 72, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 418; see also JUDA, supra  note 13, at 229.  The EEZs are estimated to
contain twenty-five percent of global primary production and ninety percent of the
world’s fish catch. See INDEP. WORLD COMM’N ON THE OCEANS, THE OCEAN, OUR
FUTURE 59 (1998).  For further discussion of the implications of the creation of the
EEZ, see A SEA CHANGE: THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND GOVERNANCE
INSTITUTIONS FOR LIVING MARINE RESOURCES 3-6, 7-18 (Syma A. Ebbin et al. eds.,
2005.
98 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 72, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 418.  The international community expects, and the 1982 Convention
provides protection for, research that furthers knowledge of the marine environ-
ment. See id.  A coastal state’s approval of a research application is presumed if an
applicant receives no response within four months. KALO ET AL., supra  note 44, at
334.  The United States has not established a consent requirement beyond its territo-
rial sea due to its commitment to unrestricted scientific research. Id.
99 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra  note 72, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 418.
100 Id.
101 See JUDA, supra  note 13, at 230 (discussing the general duties of coastal states
to protect the resources, which involves, for example, rulemaking for total allowable
catch).
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quire ownership or property rights.  Economic investments nor-
mally are not undertaken without secure rights to recoup and
even profit from the investment.
But the 1982 Convention does not clarify whether the exten-
sion of sovereign rights over the EEZ includes property rights.
Certainly, coastal states have authority to make rules regarding
exploration, exploitation, conservation, management, and pro-
duction of energy.  Commentators and scholars have expounded
at length on the extension of authority under the 1982 Conven-
tion, as well as the constraints on coastal state authority.102  But
they have not explored the nature of property rights, if any, that
coastal states may claim as a result of declaring an EEZ.
Although coastal states may have behaved as owners of the
seabed for the purposes of exploration, exploitation, and produc-
tion of hydrocarbons by state-owned companies (e.g., Statoil in
Norway),103 or by leasing tracts of the ocean floor to private enti-
ties while collecting revenues from lease sales and production
royalties,104 they are actually exercising sovereign rights to regu-
late exploration and production in their capacity as trustees on
behalf of the common owners.  When coastal states permit siting
of wind-power facilities, authorize LNG terminals offshore, or al-
low open-ocean tuna pens, they are exercising rights of imperium
in setting the rules of access and exclusion, and should not claim
ownership over the seabed, water column, or marine resources.
The 1982 Convention ensures that all nations enjoy freedom of
navigation and overflight, and the right to lay cables and pipe-
lines both on the high seas and in the EEZ.105  The United States
interprets these freedoms to include conducting military exer-
cises that do not interfere with the rights and freedoms of other
nations.106  The International Maritime Organization establishes
uniform rules and standards for protecting the marine environ-
102 See generally id.  (examining the evolution of ocean-use management); HOL-
LICK, supra  note 13 (tracing U.S. policy regarding the ocean); and FRIEDHEIM, supra
note 13 (providing an in-depth history of the 1982 Convention).
103 Statoil is a Norwegian company with sixty-two percent of its ownership held by
the government at the end of 2006.  Heather Timmons, Statoil to Buy Norsk Off-
shore Operations in $28 Billion Deal , INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 18, 2006, http://
www.iht.com/articles/2006/12/18/yourmoney/merge.php.
104 The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) gives the Secretary of the
Interior authority to regulate leasing.  43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006).
105 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra  note 72, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 418, 432.
106 KALO ET AL., supra  note 44, at 335.
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ment from vessel-source pollution, and flag states, rather than
coastal states, have primary jurisdiction to enforce those rules
and standards against vessels flagged in their nation.107  Port na-
tions also exercise rights of enforcement over any vessel in ports
visited by an offending ship.108
The 1982 Convention grants exclusive rights to coastal states to
manage fisheries as well as preferential harvest rights for coastal
states’ fishermen.109  But a coastal state’s sovereignty is limited
by obligations to conserve the living resources of the EEZ, as
well as the potentially conflicting duty to promote “optimum util-
ization.”110  Part XII of the 1982 Convention includes forty-six
articles devoted to marine environmental protection,111 begin-
ning with the general obligation of states “to protect and pre-
serve the marine environment.”112  States have a duty to “take
. . . all measures consistent with this Convention that are neces-
sary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine envi-
ronment from any source . . . ,”113 including “those [measures]
necessary to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems as
well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or endangered species
and other forms of marine life.”114  The 1982 Convention re-
quires parties to coordinate and cooperate in the management of
straddling stocks115 (transboundary species such as groundfish)
and highly migratory species116 (such as tuna and billfish).  The
1995 Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks filled a significant gap in the 1982 Convention by re-
quiring conservation and management of these stocks within the
EEZ and on the high seas.117  Thus, a coastal nation-state’s juris-
107 Id. ; see also  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra  note 72,
1833 U.N.T.S. at 479, 483, 485-87 (containing the enforcement provisions, which are
arts. 197, 211, 213, 217, & 218).
108 Id.  at 487.
109 Id.  at 421.
110 Id.  at 487 (addressing conservation of living resources), 421 (providing the
goal of optimum utilization).
111 JUDA, supra  note 13, at 235.
112 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra  note 72, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 477.  For a summary of the marine environmental-protection provisions,
see JUDA, supra  note 13, at 235-37.
113 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra  note 72, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 478.
114 Id.  at 479.
115 Id.  at 422.
116 Id.  at 423.
117 See CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra  note 37, at 378-80.
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diction over its EEZ is extensive, but restrained by international
law.  And while international law determines the extent of
coastal state jurisdiction, it does not grant ownership over ocean
space or resources.
V
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE SEA UNDER U.S. LAW
This section begins with a brief description of early conflicts
along the U.S. East Coast over tidelands and the tensions that
arose as private interests attempted to privatize common prop-
erty.  A set of U.S. Supreme Court cases in the post-World War
II period raised the issue of whether the federal government or
coastal-state governments have authority over, or property rights
to, the seabed and subsurface of offshore tidelands.  California,
Louisiana, and Texas had leased areas offshore and were collect-
ing revenues from offshore oil and gas development.  The United
States filed lawsuits first against California and then against Lou-
isiana and Texas.118  As the following discussion documents, the
Supreme Court decisions in favor of federal control rested on the
federal government’s authority (imperium), not on property
rights.  Congress gave authority (and the right to collect revenue)
back to the coastal states when it passed the Submerged Lands
Act (SLA) in 1953.119  Congress could exercise imperium , but
not dominium , in adopting the SLA and the subsequent Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) under which private
owners are able to produce oil and gas from subsea resources
through leases.
118 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339
U.S. 699 (1950), and United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950).  Control and own-
ership of offshore lands was the issue in these three cases, and the controversy is
described and analyzed in ERNEST R. BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTRO-
VERSY: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1953); HERBERT MARSHALL &
BETTY ZISK, THE FEDERAL-STATE STRUGGLE FOR OFFSHORE OIL (1969); and Wil-
liam K. Metcalfe, The Tidelands Controversy: A Study in the Development of a Politi-
cal-Legal Problem , 4 SYRACUSE L. REV. 39 (1952-53).  The controversy was
revisited more recently in EDWARD A. FITZGERALD, THE SEAWEED REBELLION:
FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS OVER OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT (2001), and
Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Seaweed Rebellion: Florida’s Experience with Offshore
Energy Development , 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2002).
119 § 3, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1) (2006).
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A. Nineteenth Century Battles Over Tidelands
Attempts to extend private property rights to tidelands trig-
gered “oyster wars” along the New Jersey coast in the nineteenth
century.120  Entrepreneurs who had seeded declining oyster beds
claimed property rights to the tidelands they “planted,” while
baymen or watermen who made a living from the oyster trade, as
well as farmers who supplemented their income by gathering and
selling oysters, resisted privatization of the tidelands.121  In the
1700s, the demands of an industrializing economy led to overex-
ploitation and ruin of natural oyster beds, not only for food, but
also for lime and fuel for iron-making furnaces.122
In the well-known case Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee , the Su-
preme Court interpreted grants made in 1664 and 1674 by
Charles II to his brother, the Duke of York, involving lands
under the navigable waters in Raritan River and Bay in New
Jersey.123  The defendant, lessee of William Waddell, claimed an
exclusive right to take oysters from 100 acres of submerged lands
of Raritan Bay.124  The Court rejected the defendant’s view that
the grant to the duke, “instead of being held as a public trust for
the benefit of the whole community, to be freely used . . . for
navigation and fishery, as well as for shell-fish . . . had been con-
verted . . . into private property, to be parcelled out and sold by
the duke for his own individual emolument.”125  Rather, the
Court declared “the land under the navigable waters passed to
the grantee, as one of the royalties incident to the powers of gov-
ernment; and were to be held by him in the same manner, and
for the same purposes, that the navigable waters of England, and
the soils under them, are held by the crown.”126  Once the people
of New Jersey formed their own colonial government, they as-
sumed the rights and responsibilities of sovereignty that had
120 BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: PROPERTY, LAW,
AND ECOLOGY IN NEW JERSEY HISTORY 7-21, 29 (1998).
121 Id.  at 30-57.  Anthropologist McCay recounts the clash between rich and poor,
proprietors and artisanal oystermen, in her detailed study of the skirmishes and en-
suing court cases over New Jersey’s oyster beds.
122 Id.  at 7-8; see also MARK KURLANSKY, THE BIG OYSTER: HISTORY ON THE
HALF SHELL (2006) (exploring the role of oysters in New York City’s history).
123 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 367 (1842).
124 Id.
125 Id.  at 413.
126 Id.  at 413-14.
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been passed by this grant to the duke.127  As Justice Thompson
pointed out in his dissent:
A majority of the court seem to have adopted the doctrine of
Arnold v. Mundy , decided in the supreme court of New
Jersey, in which it is held, that navigable rivers, where the tide
ebbs and flows, and the ports, bays and coasts of the sea, in-
cluding both the waters and the land under the water, are
common to the people of New Jersey; and that . . . all the
rights . . . passed to the duke, as governor of the province,
exercising the royal authority, and not as the proprietor of the
soil; but that he held them as trustee for the benefit of all set-
tlers in the province . . . .128
As courts and state legislatures tried to resolve these conflicts
in the 1800s, they blurred the line between the role of the state as
rule-maker and the role of the state as owner of tidelands.  The
first state oyster-bed protection laws, adopted in the 1700s, em-
ployed closed seasons and residential restrictions to protect the
interests of “poor People, and others inhabiting this Province
[New Jersey].”129  But by the late 1800s, the railroads and the
industries dependent on them, undermined the states’ obligation
to protect tidal lands.130  Legislatures authorized leases and
grants of tidal lands to private interests, and courts upheld these
grants while elaborating the common-law public trust doctrine to
protect public rights in fishing, navigation, recreation, and other
interests.131  The oyster wars, as well as the industrial era of rail-
roads and wharf building, left the coastlines of the nation pock-
marked with private titles and encumbered with private leases,
permits, or licenses.  The tension between privatization and the
protection of the public interest also has produced murky legal
opinions and a literature replete with muddled treatment of the
nature of property rights in the sea.
Today, private rights to tidelands and bottomlands run the
gamut from fee title to something less than a lease.132  Approxi-
mately seventy percent of tidelands in Puget Sound in Washing-
ton state are privately owned, according to Jay Udelhoven of The
127 Id.  at 417.
128 Id.  at 419.
129 MCCAY, supra  note 120, at 8.
130 Id.  at 111.
131 Id.
132 Telephone interview with Jay Udelhoven, Senior Policy Advisor, Global
Marine Initiative, The Nature Conservancy (Apr. 28, 2006).
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Nature Conservancy.133  These holdings usually cover the area
between mean-low and mean-high tide, but in bays and estuaries
the holdings may be extensive.134  Today, many coastal states al-
low private parties to lease shellfish beds, aquaculture areas, kelp
beds, and marinas along their coasts.135  Conservation organiza-
tions such as the Nature Conservancy are purchasing and leasing
inter-tidal and sub-tidal lands to restore biodiversity and ecosys-
tem services.136  Private ownership occasionally extends below
the low-tide line.
B. The Truman Proclamation of 1945
Prior to discovery of offshore oil at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, the question of ownership of seabed resources had
not been of any significance.137  At first, oil companies in Califor-
nia and Louisiana drilled a few shallow-water oil wells.  Oil com-
panies had sought property rights to explore and drill for oil in
the Gulf of Mexico as early as 1918, but the U.S. State Depart-
ment and the Department of the Interior responded to inquiries,
then and in the late 1930s, that neither the United States nor any
other nation had jurisdiction beyond territorial waters.138  The
search for new international legal principles and concepts began
in earnest in the 1940s as industry and the Interior Department’s
Geological Survey discovered the extent and value of offshore
petroleum deposits.139  As pressure mounted to claim these re-
sources for the United States, President Truman issued a Procla-
mation on the Continental Shelf on September 28, 1945,
asserting “jurisdiction and control” over the natural resources of
133 Id. For a discussion of the application of the public trust doctrine to sub-
merged lands that have been leased to private owners, see Tim Eichenberg et al.,
The Legal Context of Submerged Lands Leasing & Ownership , in TOWARDS CON-
SERVATION OF SUBMERGED LANDS: THE LAW AND POLICY OF CONSERVATION
LEASING AND OWNERSHIP 4 (Michael W. Beck et al. eds., 2005) available at  http://
law.edu/sites/marineaffairs/content/pdf/sublandsrpt.pdf.
134 Udelhoven, supra  note 132.
135 See generally  M. Richard DeVoe & Andrew S. Mount, An Analysis of Ten
State Aquaculture Leasing Systems: Issues and Strategies , 8 J. SHELLFISH RES. 233
(1989) (analyzing leasing programs in several coastal states).
136 Michael Beck et al., supra  note 34, at 1217.  The article contains useful infor-
mation about this new trend among private non-profit conservation organizations,
and tideland leases in general.
137 See MARSHALL & ZISK, supra  118, at 5.
138 For an excellent description of correspondence and events leading up to the
Truman Proclamation, see JUDA, supra  note 13, at 93-97.
139 See id.  at 95.
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the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf beneath the high
seas, but contiguous to the coast of the United States.140  This
unilateral assertion of control, based on “conservation and pru-
dent utilization,”141 fell short of a claim to sovereignty as the
United States sought to protect its interests in commerce, free-
dom of movement for the Navy, and distant-water fisheries.  And
“this claim was almost certainly illegal at the time. . . .”142 The
pragmatic need of the oil industry for investment security, and
the growing demand for oil in the post-war period, made it inevi-
table that coastal states would seek expanded jurisdiction over
the continental shelf.  The Truman Proclamation on the Conti-
nental Shelf initiated a “claim-and-response process of customary
international law” that helped “turn the old order of the seas into
a shambles.”143  Among the numerous unilateral claims, “Argen-
tina went the furthest in claiming ‘sovereignty, property rights
and incorporation of the shelf and sea as national territory.’”144
Many of the claims of this growing enclosure movement aimed to
exclude other states from fishing, and protect states from grow-
ing distant-water fishing fleets.  Chile and Peru (in 1947) and Ec-
uador (in 1951) were among the early states to assert 200-mile
claims to protect their fishing (and whaling for Chile) interests
against growing distant-water fleets and the U.S. tuna fleet.145
140 The Truman Proclamation declared “the natural resources of the subsoil and
sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coasts of
the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control.”  Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 68-69 (1943-1948) (Sept. 28, 1945). See
also BILIANA CICIN-SAIN & ROBERT W. KNECHT, THE FUTURE OF U.S. OCEAN
POLICY: CHOICES FOR THE NEW CENTURY 33 (2000) (elaborating on the hastened
activity toward control over oil resources).  A second Proclamation on Coastal Fish-
eries asserted a conservation zone in areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts
of the United States.  No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68-69 (1943-1948) (Sept. 28, 1945).  Neither
proclamation makes any mention of how these zones are to be measured.  They
neither specify depth in meters nor extent in miles.
141 Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 68-69.
142 KALO ET AL., supra  note 44, at 311.  International-relations scholar Lawrence
Juda, however, states that the majority view of continental shelf resources as “the
submarine extension of state territory . . . under the domain of the contiguous
coastal state” won out over the “idealists” who argued for “some form of common
ownership” or res communis . JUDA, supra  note 13, at 97.  The view that continental
shelf resources are property of coastal states overstates reality.
143 KALO ET AL., supra  note 44, at 305, 311.
144 HOLLICK, supra  note 13, at 118.
145 See KALO ET AL., supra  note 44, at 312-13. See also  P.W. Birnie, The Law of
the Sea Before and After UNCLOS I and UNCLOS II , in THE MARITIME DIMEN-
SION 13 (R.P. Barston & Patricia Birnie eds., 1980) (detailing Latin American claims
to a 200-mile sea); HOLLICK, supra  note 13, at 75-80, 85-91 (discussing these 200-
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By the fall of 1977, sixty-eight countries had claimed exclusive
fishing zones beyond twelve miles, including fifty-one claims ex-
tending to 200 miles.146  The Truman Proclamation touched off a
debate that culminated in dramatic changes to the map of ocean
claims, first in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf, and later in the 1982 Convention.  Note, however, that the
extended coastal claims mark expansions of coastal state impe-
rium , not dominium , over the seabed, subsurface, and ocean
resources.
C. State/Federal Court Battles Over Proprietary Rights
to Subsurface
After the discovery of oil under the sea floor, a great battle
began in the United States between the federal government and
the coastal states over subsurface rights in the three-mile territo-
rial sea.  The California Legislature authorized permits to pros-
pect off its coast in 1921, and collected rents and royalties for
petroleum extracted from under the ocean.147  As other states
followed California’s lead, the federal government challenged
California’s claim and alleged that the United States “is the
owner in fee simple of, or  possessed of paramount rights in and
powers over, the lands, minerals and other things of value under-
lying the Pacific Ocean, lying seaward of the ordinary low water
mark on the coast of California and outside of the inland waters
of the State, extending seaward three nautical miles . . . .”148
In the first of several decisions, in United States v. California
the Supreme Court held in favor of the federal government.149
The case raised the narrow question of who has paramount rights
in, and power over, this three-mile ocean belt—a state or the fed-
mile claims and coordinated claims of Chile, Ecuador, and Peru from 1952-1955).  In
the early 1970s, during preparations for UNCLOS III, Peru, Ecuador, and Chile
along with Panama and Brazil argued for 200-mile territorial seas, a broader claim
than that of the “patrimonialists,” who favored 200-mile economic or resource
zones. Id.  at 250-52.  For a detailed catalogue of the different political coalitions—
territorialists, patrimonialists, archipelagic states, maritime states, landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged states, the Group of 77, and technologically advanced
mining states—that is useful to understand the rationale behind varying approaches
to expanded sovereignty, see id.  at 250-56.
146 ECKERT, supra note 12, at 129.
147 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38 (1947) (citing 1921 Cal. Stat. 1921
404).
148 Id.  at 22 (emphasis added).
149 Id.  at 42-43.
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eral government.  The Court concluded in favor of the nation
rather than its subunits (coastal states).150  The Court did not ac-
cept the federal government’s argument of fee simple ownership,
but rested its decision on the “paramount rights” of the federal
government.151
Justice Black was cognizant that international law had not ex-
plicitly recognized property rights or dominium of nations in the
three-mile territorial sea.152  “[W]hen this nation was formed, the
idea of a three-mile belt over which a littoral nation could exer-
cise rights of ownership was but a nebulous suggestion.”153
Rather, the three-mile territorial sea came about as the United
States, Great Britain, and other maritime states used it to define
the limits of littoral-state jurisdiction, particularly for exercising
exclusive rights to the fishery.154  The majority opinion confirmed
that “[t]here is no substantial support in history for the idea that
[those who settled this country] wanted or claimed a right to
block off the ocean’s bottom for private ownership and use in the
extraction of its wealth.”155  But the Court reasoned that the na-
tion’s interest in “national dominion over a definite marginal
zone to protect our neutrality” led to exercises by the United
States (and other maritime nations) of “broad, if not complete
dominion . . . over our three-mile marginal belt.”156  The Court
decided that the assertion and exercise of this broad control “is
binding on this Court.”157  Justice Black wrote:
[The U.S. government] must have powers of dominion and
regulation in the interest of its revenues, its health, and the
security of its people from wa[r]s waged on or too near its
coasts.  And insofar as the nation asserts its rights under inter-
national law, whatever of value may be discovered in the seas
next to its shores and within its protective belt, will most natu-
rally be appropriated for its use.158
150 Id.  at 38-39.
151 Id.  at 38.
152 Id.  at 32.
153 Id.
154 Id.  at n.12.  Three miles had become the norm in the 1700s under the “cannon
shot rule,” as it was the distance over which nations could assert military power.
KALO ET AL., supra  note 44, at 309.
155 Id.  at 32-33.
156 Id.  at 33.
157 Id.  at 34 (citing Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212-14 (1890) and Ex
parte  Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 502-03 (1892)).
158 Id.  at 35.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-2\OEL202.txt unknown Seq: 34 30-APR-07 9:25
350 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 21, 317
What did Justice Black mean by “powers of dominion”?  Is he
using dominion as a synonym for dominium?  Can a nation ap-
propriate for its use that which is not its property?  Is the Court
asserting a property right or only exercising sovereign authority?
Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, called attention to the confu-
sion created by the majority’s finding of trespass against the
United States on the basis of “national dominion.”159  Justice
Frankfurter understood, and even explained, the difference be-
tween the Roman concept of dominium  and imperium when he
wrote in his dissent:
One may choose to say, for example, that the United States
has “national dominion” over navigable streams.  But the
power to regulate commerce over these streams, and its con-
tinued exercise, do not change the imperium of the United
States into dominium  over the land below the waters.  Of
course the United States has “paramount rights” in the sea
belt of California—the rights that are implied by the power to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the power of con-
demnation, the treaty-making power, the war power.160
The majority did not need to determine the precise ownership
interest, or even that the United States had a property interest in
the seabed, in order to decide the central issue in the case.  The
Court determined that the federal government “had paramount
rights in and powers over” the land under the sea beyond inland
waters, which resolved the case in favor of the federal govern-
ment.161  At the same time, the majority acknowledged the exis-
tence of international rights within the three-mile belt, and noted
that the rights to subsea oil “might well become the subject of
international dispute and settlement.”162  Nonetheless, the ma-
jority concluded that “the Federal Government rather than the
state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an inci-
dent to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil
under that water area, including oil.”163  This sentence, referred
to in recent cases as the “paramountcy doctrine,”164 has led to
ongoing confusion over the nature of federal rights to the seabed
159 Id.  at 44 (Frankfurter J., dissenting).
160 Id.  (emphasis added).
161 Id.  at 24.
162 Id.  at 35.
163 Id.  at 38-39.
164 Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 154 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir.
1998).
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and subsoil of the three-mile territorial sea.165  Later cases have
suggested that “full dominion” is equivalent to a property
right,166 even though dictionary definitions of dominion treat it
as a synonym for sovereignty, authority, government, and
jurisdiction.167
Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in California  calls attention to
how the majority does not rest its decision on finding that the
three-mile area of the sea “belongs, in a proprietary sense, to the
United States”168 as the government’s lawyers had urged.169  But
Frankfurter rightly expressed concern with the majority’s failure
to steer clear of a national claim of ownership that had not his-
torically occurred.  He wrote:
We have not now before us the validity of the exercise of any
of these paramount rights.  Rights of ownership are here as-
serted—and rights of ownership are something else.  Owner-
ship implies acquisition in the various ways in which land is
acquired—by conquest, by discovery and claim, by cession, by
prescription, by purchase, by condemnation. When and how
did the United States acquire this land?
. . . .
To declare that the Government has “national dominion” is
merely a way of saying that vis-a`-vis  all other nations the Gov-
ernment is the sovereign.  If that is what the Court’s decree
means, it needs no pronouncement by this Court to confer or
declare such sovereignty.  If it means more than that, it implies
that the Government has some proprietary interest.  That has
not been remotely established except by sliding from absence
of ownership by California to ownership by the United
States.170
Frankfurter characterized the three-mile area as “unclaimed
land” and argued that any determination to claim it for the
United States rested with the President and Congress.171  In
165 Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Seaweed Rebellion: Florida’s Experience with Off-
shore Energy Development , 18 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 8 (“the court confused
property rights, which are determined by domestic law, with sovereignty, which is
governed by international law.”).
166 See  discussion infra , Parts V.C.3., V.C.5.
167 “Control or the exercise of control; sovereignty.” AMERICAN HERITAGE COL-
LEGE DICTIONARY 410 (3d ed. 2000).  “Sovereign or supreme authority; the power
of governing and controlling; domination; sovereignty; control.” WEBSTER’S NEW
UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 544 (2d ed. 1983).
168 California , 332 U.S. at 43 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
169 Id.  at 44-45.
170 Id.  (emphasis added).
171 Id.  at 45.
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short, the Court did not have the authority to claim property
rights for the United States in the three-mile territorial sea.  The
Court could not go beyond the Truman Proclamation’s claim of
jurisdiction and control and did not need to go beyond that to
resolve the federal-state jurisdictional conflict before it.  Thus,
the case merely confirmed the paramount rights (sovereign au-
thority) of the federal government over a three-mile belt.  Those
paramount rights stem from the exercise of imperium  and should
not be confused with dominium  or property rights.
Following the federal government’s success against a coastal
state’s claim to reap the revenues of offshore oil and gas leasing,
the United States brought suit against Louisiana, which had
leased offshore seabed and subsoil, and claimed a right to do so
out to three marine leagues (twenty-seven nautical miles).172
The United States charged Louisiana, as well as those who pur-
ported to have valid leases from the state, with trespassing.173
Even though California  did not turn on conventional ownership
rights,174 the U.S. Attorney General asserted such property rights
in the complaint against Louisiana.175  The Court relied on Cali-
fornia .”  Justice Douglas wrote:
As we pointed out in United States v. California , the issue in
this class of litigation does not turn on title or ownership in the
conventional sense. . . .  Protection and control of the area are
indeed functions of national external sovereignty.  The margi-
nal sea is a national, not a state concern.  National interests,
national responsibilities, national concerns are involved.  The
problems of commerce, national defense, relations with other
powers, war and peace focus there.  National rights must
therefore be paramount in that area.176
As in California , the Court avoided asserting its own claim of
ownership to the offshore lands as it rejected the claim by Louisi-
172 United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 701 (1950).
173 Id.
174 Id.  at 704.
175 The United States claimed itself as “the owner in fee simple of, or possessed of
paramount rights in, and full dominion and power over, the lands, minerals, and
other things underlying the Gulf of Mexico, lying seaward of the ordinary low-water
mark on the coast of Louisiana and outside of the inland waters, extending seaward
twenty-seven marine miles. . . .  The prayer of the complaint is for a decree . . .
enjoining Louisiana and all persons claiming under it from continuing to trespass
upon the area in violation of the right of the United States. . . .” Id. at 701.
176 Id.  at 704.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-2\OEL202.txt unknown Seq: 37 30-APR-07 9:25
2006] New Discourses on Ocean Governance 353
ana, instead relying on the paramount rights rationale “fully
elaborated” in California .177
1. The SLA of 1953
With Supreme Court decisions that took away the coastal
states’ revenues from offshore oil and gas leasing, the coastal
states turned to Congress to regain control and revenue from
these seabed resources.  In May 1953, Congress passed the SLA,
granting coastal states “title to and ownership of the lands be-
neath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective
States, and the natural resources within such lands and wa-
ters.”178  The Act defines “lands beneath navigable waters” to
reach seaward three geographical miles from the coastlines of
states bordering the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, or, in the case
of Texas and Florida, for example, no more than three marine
leagues into the Gulf of Mexico.179
Congress clearly intended states to have property rights to the
seafloor and subsurface, but was cautious about overstating its
ownership rights over these lands and resources: “The United
States releases and relinquishes unto said States and persons
aforesaid, except as otherwise reserved herein, all right, title, and
interest of the United States, if any it has , in and to all said lands,
improvements, and natural resources. . . .”180
How could Congress grant ownership rights that the United
States did not possess?  The SLA confirmed federal retention of
authority over these submerged lands, as well as navigable waters
for specific constitutional purposes (commerce, navigation, na-
tional defense, and international affairs), but did not retain “pro-
prietary rights of ownership, or the rights of management,
administration, leasing, use, and development of the lands and
natural resources which are specifically recognized, confirmed,
established, and vested in and assigned to the respective States
and others by section 1311 of this Act.”181
177 Id.
178 Submerged Lands Act of 1953,  § 3, 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1) (2006).
179 Id. § 1301 (a)(2)-(3)(b).  Congress later granted Puerto Rico jurisdiction to
nine nautical miles. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra  note 6, at 70.
180 § 1311(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
181 Id.  § 1314(a).
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An interpretation of the SLA consistent with international law
is that the three- (or nine-) mile belt182 remained common prop-
erty, and coastal states’ governments hold the submerged lands
as trustees for the common property owners in addition to exer-
cising regulatory authority.  The states, then, assume the public
trust responsibilities previously held by the federal government.
In California , the Court had applied the public trust doctrine to
reject the state’s argument that actions of federal agents had re-
sulted in loss of federal rights in the three-mile belt.183  I will dis-
cuss the public trust doctrine further in section VI of this article.
Notably, Congress confirmed federal “jurisdiction and con-
trol” over “the natural resources of that portion of the subsoil
and seabed of the Continental Shelf lying seaward and outside of
the area of lands beneath navigable waters, as defined in section
1301” of the SLA, the lands over which the states were to exer-
cise control.184
2. The OCSLA of 1953
Less than three months after the SLA was passed, Congress
approved the OCSLA of 1953, authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to lease submerged lands beyond the jurisdiction granted
to states in the SLA.185  Section 3 of the OCSLA, adopted on
August 7, 1953, declared the policy of the United States “that the
subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to
the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and
power of disposition as provided in this [Act].”186
Although Kalo substituted “belong” as a synonym for “apper-
tain,”187 a more apt meaning of “appertain” is that the outer con-
tinental shelf is connected to the United States geographically,
geologically, and functionally.  The outer continental shelf may
182 For historical reasons, jurisdiction extends nine nautical miles seaward from
the coastal baseline for Texas, the Gulf Coast of Florida, and Puerto Rico. OCEAN
BLUEPRINT, supra  note 6, at 70.
183 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 40 (1947) (“The Government, which
holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all the people, is not to be deprived
of those interests by the ordinary court rules designed particularly for private dis-
putes over individually owned pieces of property. . . .”).
184 43 U.S.C. § 1302.
185 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, § 5, 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006).
186 Id.  § 1332(1).  Arguably, at the time of its adoption in 1953, the OCSLA was
illegal.  It would have been hard to find any legal justification in international law
for the unilateral extension of authority into international waters.
187 KALO ET AL., supra  note 44, at 376.
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be a part of the United States without being the property of the
United States.  The OCSLA asserts authority, or imperium , of
the United States over the outer continental shelf from the
boundary of “submerged lands” as defined in the SLA.188  Al-
though it is problematic that the OCSLA states that the United
States has the power of disposition over the subsoil and seabed,
the disposition allowed by the Act does not go beyond leasing of
soil and subsurface tracts for specified, limited terms and with
numerous conditions.189
Section 2(a) of the OCSLA makes no claim of overt owner-
ship; it simply defines the outer continental shelf as: “all sub-
merged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands
beneath navigable waters as defined in [section 2 of the Sub-
merged Lands Act] . . . and of which the subsoil and seabed ap-
pertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and
control.”190
Importantly, the OCSLA did not affect ownership or control
of the waters above the outer continental shelf nor change its
character in law.  As in the 1945 Truman Proclamation, the OC-
SLA confirmed that the water column and resources above the
Shelf are part of the “high seas.”191  Section 3(b) states: “This
Act shall be construed in such a manner that the character as
high seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf and the
right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected.”192
3. Alabama v. Texas (1954)
After the SLA was passed, Alabama and Rhode Island filed
motions in the Supreme Court requesting leave to challenge the
rights of other states to hold property ceded to them under the
SLA.193  In a per curium opinion, the Supreme Court denied
these motions.194  Despite the Court’s earlier caution to avoid us-
ing property rights or ownership as a basis for its decisions in
California , Texas , and Louisiana , the Alabama  Court used the
188 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a), (a)(1).
189 Under § 12(a) of the OCSLA, the President “may, from time to time, with-
draw from disposition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.” Id.
§ 1341(a).
190 Id.  § 1331(a).
191 Id.  § 1332(2).
192 Id.
193 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954).
194 Id.
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Constitution’s Property Clause195 and earlier cases to treat the
subsoil and seabed of the marginal seas as property of the United
States.  The Court’s decision in Alabama is troubling because, as
discussed above, the three-mile belt is common property, not
state-owned property: the role of the government is as a trus-
tee.196  While purporting to follow California , the Court dis-
torted earlier decisions when it declared:
The power of Congress to dispose of any kind of property be-
longing to the United States “is vested in Congress without
limitation. For it must be borne in mind that Congress not
only has a legislative power over the public domain, but it also
exercises the powers of the proprietor therein.  Congress may
deal with such lands precisely as an ordinary individual may
deal with farming property.  It may sell or withhold them from
sale.  Article 4, Section 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution provides
that [t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory and
other Property belonging to the United States.  The power
over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without lim-
itations.  And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall
be administered.  That is for Congress to determine.  We have
said that the constitutional power of Congress [under Article
IV, Section 3, Cl. 2] is without limitation.197
Justice Reed’s concurrence shed some light on the basis for the
motions by Alabama and Rhode Island.  Justice Reed explained
that these states relied on the earlier California , Texas , and Loui-
siana  cases to assert that “the ‘paramount rights’ of the United
States decreed by this Court arose from the sovereignty of the
United States. . . .”198  The states, Justice Reed explained, used
the equal-footing doctrine in appealing to the Court to determine
“that the rights are held in trust for all the states. . . .”199 Justice
Reed admitted that the Supreme Court had not held earlier that
the subsurface and seabed “belonged to the United States as a
proprietor,” but interpreted the “paramount rights in and power
over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the re-
sources of the soil under that water area, including oil,”200 as a
195 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
196 See supra  text accompanying note 183.
197 Alabama , 347 U.S. at 273-74 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
198 Id.  at 274 (Reed, J., concurring).
199 Id .  Justice Black’s dissent also acknowledged this assertion, noting that the
states argued “that whatever power the United States has over the Ocean is an in-
separable part of national sovereignty which cannot be irrevocably parcelled out or
delegated to states, individuals or private business groups.” Id.  at 277.
200 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947).
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property right over which Congress had unlimited power of dis-
position.201  Justice Reed explained that “if . . . the marginal
lands were not declared by those cases to belong to the United
States, then title to them remained in the respective states.”202
The majority and concurring opinions in Alabama demon-
strate how easy it was for Congress and the Court to slide from a
cautious approach that fell short of declaring any ownership in-
terest in the resources under the marginal seas, to affirming pro-
prietary rights that Congress could transfer to the states, which
could then lease to private owners.  The prevailing view that re-
sources should be extracted for use by the nation, coupled with
the need for security of investment by private enterprises, inevi-
tably led to a position that affirmed proprietary rights to margi-
nal lands over which Congress had extensive authority.
Justice Black, who had written the majority opinion in Califor-
nia , was deeply troubled by the Court’s rejection of Alabama’s
and Rhode Island’s motions.  He wanted the cases to be heard on
their merits, and wrote forcefully of the difficulties of treating the
subsea lands as public property over which Congress may exer-
cise unlimited authority, arguing that the oceans were the com-
mon property of all.203  The United States, he argued:
[C]ould produce oil from the ocean and sell that property.  It
could have that oil produced by its agents.  But I have diffi-
culty in believing that any state can be granted power under
our Constitution to exact tribute from any other state that
wants to take oil or fish from the ocean which is the common
“property” of all.  And I have trouble also in thinking Con-
gress could sell or give away the Atlantic or Pacific oceans.  If
it can treat those oceans as “Territory” within the Constitu-
tion’s meaning, why could it not deed away thousands of miles
of the Atlantic or Pacific at will?204
Justice Black predicted, “Once private property rights in ocean
waters are recognized, I am uncertain where lines can be
drawn.”205  Quoting from an 1881 Court decision, Justice Black
wrote, “We should not forget that the ocean ‘belongs to no one
nation, but is the common property of all.’”206
201 Alabama , 347 U.S. at 275.
202 Id.  at 276.
203 Id.  at 278-80 (Black, J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 280.
205 Id.  at 279.
206 Id. (quoting Lord v. Steamship Co., 102 U.S. 541, 544 (1881)).
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4. United States v. Maine (1970-1975)
Between 1953, when Congress enacted the SLA and the OC-
SLA, and 1975, the Department of the Interior held thirty-three
lease sales and granted 1940 leases covering more than eight mil-
lion acres of the outer continental shelf.207  Private leaseholders
extracted three billion barrels of oil, 19 trillion Mcf208 of natural
gas, and millions of tons of sulfur and salt from the outer conti-
nental shelf.209  But the issue of ownership of the seabed and al-
location of rights between the states and the federal government
had not been laid to rest.  In 1969, the United States sought leave
to file a complaint in the Supreme Court against the thirteen At-
lantic states to exclude them from exercising rights over the sea-
bed and subsoil lying more than three miles seaward of the
ordinary low-water along the Atlantic Coast.210  The Atlantic
states from Maine to Florida challenged the proprietary rights of
the United States in this seabed area, and claimed for themselves
“the exclusive right of dominion and control over the seabed un-
derlying the Atlantic Ocean seaward from its coastline to the lim-
its of the jurisdiction of the United States.”211  The Supreme
Court assigned a Special Master to request further pleadings,
summon witnesses, take evidence, and submit a report.212  Fol-
lowing the recommendations of the Special Master, the Court de-
clined to overrule its decisions in the California , Texas , and
Louisiana  cases.  The Court affirmed these earlier rulings and
found them binding over the Atlantic states.213
The Court reaffirmed that “this class of litigation does not turn
on title or ownership in the conventional sense.”214  Rather, the
Court rested its decision on the attributes of sovereignty to af-
firm that the national government and not the states must exer-
cise “protection and control of the area” as “functions of national
external sovereignty.”215  If there was confusion from earlier
207 United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 527 (1975).
208 One Mcf = 1000 cubic feet, or one dekatherm (10 therms).  American Gas
Association, http://www.aga.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About_Natural_Gas
How_to_Measure_Natural_Gas/How_to_Measure_Natural_Gas.htm (last visited
March 13, 2007).
209 Maine,  420 U.S. at 526.
210 Id.  at 515.
211 Id.  at 518.
212 United States v. Maine, 398 U.S. 947, 947 (1970).
213 Maine , 420 U.S. at 527-28.
214 Id.  at 520-21 (quoting United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 31-34 (1975)).
215 Id.  at 521 (quoting California , 332 U.S. at 31-34).
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cases, this 1975 decision emphasized that the United States’ “par-
amount rights in the marginal sea,” determined in the earlier
cases, stem from the exercise of sovereignty rather than owner-
ship.216  The Maine  Court reiterated that whatever ownership the
states might have had prior to statehood “did not survive becom-
ing a member of the Union.”217  In the Court’s view, Congress
“embraced” rather than “repudiated” this basis in passing the
SLA.218  The Court confirmed that the SLA’s transfer to the
states of rights to the seabed “was in no wise inconsistent with
paramount national power but was merely an exercise of that
authority.”219
5. Ninth Circuit Cases (1999-2005)
The question of property rights arose again in two Ninth Cir-
cuit cases.  The first began with claims of five Alaska Native vil-
lages to aboriginal title and exclusive fishing and hunting rights
to a portion of the outer continental shelf.220  The second ad-
dressed ownership claims to submerged lands offshore of the
Northern Mariana Islands.221  In both cases, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the claims on the basis of the paramount interest of the
United States as found by the Supreme Court in California .222
The claims of the native villages as well as the Northern Mariana
Islands failed for being inconsistent with the paramountcy doc-
trine, which ascribes paramount rights to the federal govern-
ment.223  Neither would the Ninth Circuit imply a grant of
submerged lands in the covenant establishing the Northern Mari-
ana Islands where there was no explicit grant.  The Ninth Circuit
had no need in either case to determine the “ownership” of the
submerged land.  In the Northern Mariana Islands case, Judge
Beezer heads toward the slippery slope of property rights by stat-
ing that Congress, under the paramountcy doctrine, “can transfer
216 Id.  at 523.
217 Id.  (quoting United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1950)).
218 Id.  at 524.
219 Id.
220 Native Village of Eyak v. Trawler Diane Marie, 154 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th Cir.
1998), cert. denied , 527 U.S. 1003 (1999).
221 N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 399 F.3d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied , 126 S. Ct. 1566 (2006).
222 N. Mariana Islands , 399 F.3d at 1060-61; Native Village of Eyak , 154 F.3d at
1092.
223 See supra  text accompanying notes 149-76.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\21-2\OEL202.txt unknown Seq: 44 30-APR-07 9:25
360 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 21, 317
ownership of submerged lands to the states or other entities.”224
In revisiting several Supreme Court cases, the Ninth Circuit cites
the Supreme Court in Alabama v. Texas , stating that “[T]his is an
instance where property interests are so subordinated to the
rights of sovereignty as to follow sovereignty.”225  This circular
reasoning from the Texas case which so troubled Justice Black at
the time,226 has led to muddled analyses in these recent Ninth
Circuit decisions as judges failed to separate the authority of the
federal government from property rights.  Neither of the deci-
sions, however, needed to rely on a determination of ownership
or property rights.  It is sufficient that in both cases the Ninth
Circuit determined that the paramount rights of the federal gov-
ernment bar the competing states’ claims to control over the
outer continental shelf.227
6. Offshore Leases May Convey “a Property Interest”
The overview of federal cases above illustrates the difficulty in
separating property rights from authority.  The effect of the Ge-
neva Conventions of 1958 was to convert what was once common
property of all nations to common property under the limited
sovereignty of coastal nation-states.  In exercising its new rights
to explore and exploit seabed and surface resources, the United
States exercised its coastal-state rights by granting a limited bun-
dle of property rights including use, possessory, and some exclu-
sionary rights to private owners.  As the Minerals Management
Service drafts new regulations for authorizing development of
offshore renewable-energy facilities,228 it should note the
problems encountered with the oil and gas leasing system, and
224 N. Mariana Islands , 399 F.3d at 1063 (citing the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1310, 1311 (2000)).
225 N. Mariana Islands , 399 F.3d at 1066 (citing United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707, 719 (1950)).
226 See supra  text accompanying notes 203-06.
227 “The Constitution allotted to the federal government jurisdiction over foreign
commerce, foreign affairs, and national defense so that as attributes of these exter-
nal sovereign powers, it has paramount rights in the contested areas of the sea.  This
principle applies with equal force to all  entities claiming rights to the ocean: whether
they be the Native Villages, the State of Oregon, or the Township of Parsippany.”
Native Village of Eyak , 154 F.3d at 1096.
228 The Minerals Management Service sought comments on development of a reg-
ulatory program to implement portions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section
833-Alternative Energy-Related Uses on the Outer Continental Shelf.  Alternate
Energy-Related Uses on the Outer Continental Shelf, 70 Fed. Reg. 77,345-01 (Dec.
30, 2005) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 285).
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the pitfalls of replicating these problems in authorizing other off-
shore facilities.
Once the federal government has collected large up-front fees,
later changes in the procedural or substantive requirements may
result in requiring the government to return the original fees de-
spite the willingness of the original lessee to bear the risk that the
investment would not be profitable for lack of sufficient re-
sources, environmental risks, or other concerns.  A Ninth Circuit
decision regarding the right of four oil companies to construct a
drilling platform in the Santa Barbara Channel under a federal
oil and gas lease raised the issue of the nature of property rights
conveyed in a lease under the OCSLA.229  The court likened the
outer-continental-shelf lease to a mineral lease under the Min-
eral Leasing Act of 1920,230 stating:
A lease issued under [the OCSLA], like a Mineral Lease
granted under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, does not con-
vey title in the land, nor does it convey an unencumbered es-
tate in the oil and gas.  The lease does convey a property
interest enforceable against the Government, of course, but it
is an interest lacking many of the attributes of private
property.231
The need for investment security and the fact that the oil compa-
nies had paid more than $61 million for the lease tract perhaps
influenced the finding of a vested property-interest.232  Judge
Choy wrote:
The structure of the [OCSLA] demonstrates that Congress in-
tended vested rights under the lease to be invulnerable to de-
feasance by subsequently issued regulations. . . . Congress
clearly did not intend to grant leases so tenuous in nature that
the Secretary could terminate them, in whole or in part, at
will.233
The court regarded the property interest in the lease to be suffi-
cient, and considered whether suspension of the lease interfered
229 Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1975).
230 Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 109-279, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
231 Union Oil Co. of Cal ., 512 F.2d at 747.
232 Id.  at 746.
233 Id.  at 750. (“The potential lessees of outer Shelf land . . . realize that they are
subject to police-power regulations which can be modified from time to time.  But
they are sensitive to provisions that would give the United States power to change
the proprietary regulations governing the lease after the issuance of a lease.”  (citing
Warren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New Fron-
tier , 6 STAN. L. REV. 23, 44 (1953)).
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with private property enough to be an unconstitutional “taking”
for which the government must compensate.234  The court wrote
that “[w]hether the Secretary has taken Union’s property de-
pends on the conditions of the suspension.  If operations are sus-
pended indefinitely, property rights have been taken.”235  The
court vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case
to determine whether the suspension exceeded the Secretary’s
statutory authority.236
VI
PROTECTING COMMON PROPERTY INTERESTS
THROUGH CONTRACT LAW AND THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
As previous sections demonstrate, the oceans and their re-
sources are common property, and the role of the government is
that of a trustee or fiduciary.  In the oceans, the federal govern-
ment (or state government within state waters) has authority to
grant limited property rights that fall short of ownership through
leases, easements, concessions, or other instruments.  But gov-
ernment does not have the authority to transfer ownership of
ocean space to private entities.237  This section discusses how
contract law and application of the public trust doctrine may be
used in tandem to provide investment security for offshore facili-
ties while protecting the ocean’s assets for current and future
owners of the ocean commons.
A. Application of Contract Law
Recent cases, including one confirmed by the Supreme Court
in 2000,238 rely on contract theories such as rights of restitution
and rescission, rather than on property law to provide security of
investment for offshore leases against statutory changes.239
These cases demonstrate a strong preference of the courts to re-
store full payment of the original contract price to a lessee when
234 Union Oil Co. of Cal ., 512 F.2d at 750.
235 Id.  at 751.
236 Id.  at 752.
237 See supra  text accompanying notes 39-43.
238 See  Mobile Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc., v. United States, 530 U.S.
604 (2000); see also infra  text accompanying notes 242-44.
239 For an in-depth discussion of the differences between the remedies available in
restitution (or reliance) and rescission, see Amber Res. Co. v. United States , 73 Fed.
Cl. 738, 742-47 (2006).
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the lessee is subjected to additional hurdles and procedural re-
quirements due to a change in the law.240  Regulatory changes in
accord with the original law do not present the same problem.
This has been true even when the current holders of an offshore
oil and gas lease are not the same as the original lessee and, quite
likely, paid only some fraction of the original purchase price.241
In 2000, the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment against the
federal government for breaching lease contracts purchased in
1981 by Mobil Oil and Marathon Oil to explore and drill off the
shore of North Carolina, awarding $156 million to Mobil Oil.242
The Court found that the Secretary of the Interior breached the
contracts after Congress passed the Outer Banks Protection
Act.243  The Court of Federal Claims had determined that the
new statutory conditions and the Department of the Interior’s
actions in accordance with the Outer Banks Protection Act con-
stituted a breach for which the United States owed restitution in
the amount of the original contract payments.244
In 2005, the Court of Federal Claims relied on the Supreme
Court’s decision in Mobil Oil  when it ordered the United States
to return $1.1 billion to holders of thirty-six leases off the Califor-
nia coast.245  The award was granted after Congressional amend-
ments to the OCSLA in 1990 resulted in a requirement that the
United States obtain a determination of consistency from Cali-
fornia for lease suspensions that had not previously been subject
to review by the California Coastal Commission.246  These recent
cases do not speak to the nature of property rights under an
outer continental shelf lease.  Rather they employ contract law to
240 See id.  at 738.
241 Most of the plaintiffs in Amber Resources Co. v. United States  are successors to
the original lessees and paid less than the original bonus bid to take over the leases.
73 Fed. Cl. 738, 747-48 (2006).
242 Mobil Oil Exploration , 530 U.S. at 607-09 (2000). For discussions of the case,
see H. David Gold, Supreme Court Orders Federal Government to Return More
Than $150 Million to Oil Companies , 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 550 (2001); and Diana
Schroeher, Mobile Oil Exploration v. U.S.: The Supreme Court Addresses Repudia-
tion by the Federal Government of Leasing Contracts to Explore and Develop Oil , 8
U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 208 (2001).
243 Mobil Oil Exploration , 530 U.S. at 618-19.  The Outer Banks Protection Act
was repealed in 1996.  Act of Apr. 26, 1996, § 109, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321, 1498.
244 Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1331,
1333 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d , 35 Fed. Cl. 309 (1996), rev’d , 530 U.S. 604 (2000).
245 Amber Res. Co. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 535, 544-46 (2005).
246 Id. at 541 (discussing California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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determine a substantial breach of contract when Congress made
it more difficult for lessees to move forward with exploration and
development, or even to renew suspensions of leases originally
executed between 1968 and 1984.  The leases had been sus-
pended or prolonged beyond the initial five-year term numerous
times, but the suspension order by Minerals Management Service
in 1999 triggered a lawsuit by the State of California for failure to
meet the requirements for certification by the State contained
the Coastal Zone Management Act, section 307(c)(1).247  The
1990 amendments deleted prior requirements for consistency de-
terminations only for federal actions “directly affecting” the
coastal zone.248
These cases demonstrate that while an offshore oil and gas
lease does not convey a title in the seabed or an unencumbered
right to the oil and gas resources that may be discovered, the
lease does provide extensive investment security.  While the orig-
inal terms of leases were only five to ten years, the use of suspen-
sions (periods in which the lessee need only inform the Minerals
Management Service of its reasons for the suspension and a
schedule for work to be pursued during the suspension249) has
enabled companies to retain possession of leases to more margi-
nal oil and gas reserves for decades while waiting for favorable
production conditions (e.g., a substantial increase in the price of
oil, advanced drilling technology, or other conditions).250  The
Claims Court’s $1.1 billion award to holders of thirty-six leases
off the California coast may re-open negotiation of a buy-back by
the federal government.251
247 Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (2006).
248 “Each Federal agency [conducting or supporting activities directly affecting]
activity within or outside the coastal zone that affects any land or water use or natural
resource of  the coastal zone shall [conduct or support those activities] be carried out
in a manner which is consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the enforce-
able policies  of approved State management programs. . . .” Id.  § 1456(c)(1)(A).
Compare  Pub. L. No. 89-454, 86 Stat. 1280, 1285 (Oct. 12, 1972), and  Pub. L. No.
101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-307 (Nov. 5, 1990) (additions italicized and deletions
bracketed).
249 Amber Res. Co ., 68 Fed. Cl. at 538.  (“Lessees frequently request suspensions
to prevent lease expiration in the face of ongoing exploration or development activi-
ties that have not yet resulted in the production of oil in paying quantities.”).
250 Id.
251 Melinda Burns, U.S. To Pay $1.1 B to Oil Firms , SANTA BARBARA NEWS
PRESS, Nov. 19, 2005, at A1; see also , LEASING OIL AND NATURAL GAS RESOURCES,
supra  note 3, at 36 (discussing the authorization of the Secretary of the Interior to
cancel leases and compensate lessees).
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Environmental and fishing organizations have urged the Min-
erals Management Service to not replicate the leasing systems
used for oil and gas development in developing a regulatory sys-
tem for authorizing offshore renewable-energy.252  Their com-
ments stressed the importance of terms that would make it
possible for the government to revoke leases if conditions to pro-
tect living resources are not met.253  Additionally, they urged the
MMS to not emulate outer continental shelf programs such as
royalty forgiveness and royalties in kind, in order to prevent
speculative transfers of a license to anyone other than the origi-
nal lessee.254  They also urged the MMS to prevent the “misuse”
of the suspension program that allows oil and gas developers to
sit on their licenses and wait until prices increase or technology
develops.255  In crafting the terms of any lease, the MMS could
provide adequate investment security to encourage development
of renewable technologies but avoid granting a set of property
rights that undermine the interests of other members of the com-
munity who share ownership in the community property.
B. Government’s Fiduciary Responsibility and the Public
Trust Doctrine
“The public trust is a fundamental doctrine in American Prop-
erty law. . . .”256  Said to be derived from ancient Roman law, the
252 Letter from Carl Pope et al., Executive Dir., Sierra Club, to Minerals Manage-
ment Service, (Feb. 28, 2006), available at  http://ocsconnect.mms.gov/pcs-public/do/
CommentDetailView;jsessionid=GyMByznp1KpLS80Y6LQX91BHpv82h0m22n79x
LbZTW9GTvHy416f!428659386?objectId=09011f8080067f40.  Other signatories in-
clude Defenders of Wildlife, Institute for Fisheries Resources, Pacific Coast Federa-
tion of Fishermen’s Associations, Cook Inlet Keeper, Alaska Wilderness League,
and U.S. PIRG.  The Humane Society of the United States urged a twenty-year limit
before renewal.  Letter from Sharon B. Young, Marine Issues Field Dir., Humane
Society of the United States, to Minerals Management Service 3 (Feb. 28, 2006) (on
file with author).  The Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society urged finite limits
of “20 years or 10 years renewable for an additional 10 years subject to a clean
environmental audit at the 10 year mark.”  Letter from Regina A. Asmutis-Silvia,
Biologist, Whale and Dolphin Conservation Society, to Minerals Management Ser-
vice 2 (Feb. 28, 2006) (on file with author).
253 Pope, supra  note 252, at 4.
254 Id.  at 3-4; see also  Letter from Mark Sinclair, Deputy Dir., Clean Energy
States Alliance, to Minerals Management Service (Feb. 27, 2006) (containing useful
comments on bonus bids and royalty terms), available at  http://www.cleanenergy
funds.org/JointProjects/offshore%20docs/CESA_ANOPR_Final_Comments2.06.
pdf.
255 Pope, supra  note 252, at 4.
256 Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American
Property Law , 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516 (1989).
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doctrine has been developed by American courts on the basis of
English common law.257  This section summarizes the nature of
the public trust doctrine, and asks several questions.  To what
part of the seas does it apply?  Who administers, interprets, and
applies the trust doctrine?  To what uses may public trust lands in
the seas be put, and what are the limits to uses of public trust
resources?  In the United States, public trust principles are in-
cluded in some state constitutions and reflected in numerous fed-
eral and state laws.258  Public trust resources are held and
managed by a government (the trustee) for the benefit of a speci-
fied human community (the people).  The role of the state is
more limited over trust resources than over public (state) prop-
erty.  The nature of the public trust or trusteeship concept is
trilateral.
FIGURE 3. INTERNATIONAL MENTAL TRUSTEESHIP259
Public trust resources are held in trust for the benefit of a
larger community of people.  The beneficiaries may vary from all
members of a particular country to some subset of those mem-
bers, or might encompass all members of the global human com-
munity.  The relevant level of government acts in a fiduciary
257 Id.  at 519; see also CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra  note 37, at 19.
258 For recent discussions of the public trust doctrine and its U.S. application to
coastal states, see SLADE, supra  note 42, at 19-21; Jon M. Van Dyke, The Role of a
Constitution for the U.S. Oceans, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT.  273, 289-90 (1992);
JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE & THE MANAGEMENT OF
AMERICA’S COASTS (1994); Matthew T. Kirsch, Upholding the Public Trust in State
Constitutions , 46 DUKE L. J. 1169 (1997); and Alan Kanner, The Public Trust Doc-
trine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State’s Natural
Resources , 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57 (2005). For a discussion of the public
trust doctrine and coastal management in Washington, see Ralph W. Johnson et al.,
The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State , 67
WASH. L. REV. 521 (1992).
259 Sand, supra note 67, at 55 fig.1.
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capacity as the trustee to protect the corpus (the productive ca-
pacity) of the trust resources for the beneficiaries who include
both the current and future members of the community.  The
government may neither extinguish the trust nor permanently
alienate the trust resources.260  While private uses may be per-
mitted, the use must be consistent with public trust purposes and
limited to activities that do not harm or interfere with them.
These purposes traditionally encompassed navigation, com-
merce, and fishing, but the purposes change to reflect changing
public perceptions, values, and human needs.261  Thus, appropri-
ate uses of public trust resources today may be limited to those
that do not harm or interfere with numerous recreational pur-
poses (boating, fishing, and swimming) and even with ecological
and aesthetic purposes, including preservation of lands in their
natural state.262  The Washington Supreme Court upheld a local
ordinance prohibiting the use of personal watercraft in public
trust waters to prevent harm to waters and wildlife.263
As demands for new or expanded uses of public trust resources
lead to conflict, the trustee must weigh current-use value against
the interest of future beneficiaries to determine the appropriate
trade-off between current profits and long-term provision of
goods and services from the public trust property.  Unlike a pri-
vate foundation trust invested in monetary instruments, the
corpus of a trust in the ocean cannot be converted to monetary
instruments and invested solely for profit.  The ocean, or more
aptly, ocean ecosystems, must be protected so that they may con-
tinue to produce ecosystem services (food, medicine, climate sta-
bilization, recreation, aesthetic enjoyment, as well as navigation
and commerce).264  We now recognize the important role of the
260 Kanner, supra note 258, at 76.
261 See  Sax, supra  note 40, at 477; see also  Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380
(Cal. 1971) (defining public trust easements).
262 Marks , 491 P.2d at 380. See also  CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, SEAWA-
TER DESALINATION AND THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT 41 (March 2004) (report-
ing on the status of and issues regarding desalination along the California coast),
available at  http://www.coastal.ca.gov/energy/14a-3-2004-desalination.pdf; SLADE,
supra  note 42, at xxi (“Recognized public uses of trust lands today include fishing,
bathing, sunbathing, swimming, strolling, pushing a baby stroller, hunting, fowling,
both recreational and commercial navigation, environmental protection, preserva-
tion of scenic beauty, and perhaps the most basic use, just being there.”).
263 Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 284 (Wash. 1998).
264 For a pilot study to value those services on a global scale, see Robert Costanza
et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital , 387 NATURE
253 (1997).
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oceans in moderating and stabilizing the earth’s climate as well as
the vital role of the oceans in providing seafood (wild and culti-
vated).  Along many coastlines, the economic value of tourism,
recreation, and the associated services related to these industries
far outstrip revenues from commercial fishing.265  The wide-
spread movement to create marine-protected areas, including
marine reserves that are off-limits to commercial and recrea-
tional fishing, reflects this readjustment of priorities.266  The shift
to ecosystem-based management called for in a 2005 Scientific
Consensus Statement267 may gradually reshape government pri-
orities and the application of the public trust doctrine.  Courts
have emphasized the flexibility of the public trust doctrine.268
The allowed uses are not fixed, but the principles are.  Thus,
water-dependent activities usually are allowed by the public trust
doctrine, but commercial and residential developments are not
allowed except as incidental to water-dependent structures.269
265 See  National Ocean Economics Program, About NOEP http://
noep.csumb.edu/About/overview.asp (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).  Market and non-
market valuation data is available through the Program’s website, http://
noep.csumb.edu/.
266 Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park is a prime example of a large
marine-protected area with multiple zones including no-take and no-go zones. See
The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/ (last visited Mar.
23, 2007).  California’s Fish and Game Commission approved the state’s first net-
work of marine reserves around the Channel Islands off Santa Barbara in 2002.
Lydia K. Bergen & Mark H. Carr, Establishing Marine Reserves: How Can Science
Best Inform Policy?  45 ENV’T 2, 8 (March 2003).  The National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration (National Marine Sanctuaries Office and NOAA Fisheries)
are now considering additions to this network within federal waters. CHANNEL IS-
LANDS NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARY, MARINE RESERVES ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
VIEW PROCESS, http://channelislands .nos.noaa.gov/marineres/main.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2007).  Additionally, California is developing a network of marine-protected
areas off the central coast. CAL. DEP’T OF FISH & GAME, MARINE DIV., MARINE
LIFE PROTECTION ACT INITIATIVE, http://www.dfg.ca.gov/mrd/mlpa/meetings.html
(last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
267 NAT’L CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS, SCIENTIFIC CONSEN-
SUS STATEMENT ON ECOSYSTEM-BASED MANAGEMENT (2001), reprinted in  Bergen
& Carr, supra  note 266, at 13.
268 See  Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
269 See CAL. STATE LANDS COMM’N, PUBLIC TRUST POLICY, available at
www.slc.ca.gov/Policy%20Statements/Public_Trust_Trust-Policy.pdf (“Uses that are
generally not permitted on public trust lands are those that are not trust-use related,
do not serve a public purpose, and can be located on non-waterfront property, such
as residential and non-maritime related commercial and office uses.”) (last visited
Feb. 11, 2007).  Prominent ocean-law scholars have discussed priority rules applica-
ble to resolving conflicts over use of ocean resources. See  Richard G. Hildreth, The
Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal and Ocean Resources Management , 8 J. ENVTL.
LAW & LITIG. 221, 230 (1993) (discussing several candidate priority rules); see also
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New uses, such as offshore renewable-energy development;
open-water aquaculture; offshore, floating, LNG terminals; and
mining of deep-sea vents would present a challenge for govern-
ment trustees as each would entail closure of some areas to pub-
lic access.  In a private trust, the trustee may be given instructions
to invest conservatively and thus might be reluctant to allocate
trust assets to new ventures.  By analogy, government policy sets
the terms for exercise of public trust obligations, and implement-
ing agencies must exercise their trust responsibility in accord with
current (and changing) policy.  Many scholars consider the prin-
ciple of intergenerational equity to be a part of the public trust
doctrine.270  Professor Donna Christie used this principle to ex-
plain how marine reserves, though they restrict public access,
conform to the purposes of the public trust doctrine.271
In an era of increased understanding of the importance of
ecosystem-based thinking and management, there is little doubt
that the trustee of public trust resources must act as a steward for
future generations as well as the present.
In the United States, the public trust doctrine has been applied
widely to navigable waters, and tidal and submerged lands.  Liv-
ing resources within these waters and on these lands are also sub-
ject to the public trust.  Under English common law, the
sovereign held these lands and resources not as an owner but as a
trustee.  The United States assumed this role after independence
and passed the trusteeship over these resources (at least to the
extent of each state’s jurisdiction) to the original states272 and
Jack H. Archer & M. Casey Jarman, Sovereign Rights and Responsibilities: Applying
Public Trust Principles to the Management of EEZ Space and Resources , 17 OCEAN
& COASTAL MGMT.  253, 263-64 (1992) (recommending principles that would re-
quire the federal government to become more environmentally sensitive trustees of
oceans); and M. Casey Jarman, The Use of the Public Trust Doctrine for Resource-
Based Area-Wide Management: What Lessons Can We Learn from the Navigable
Waters Trust , 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 7, 14 (1994) (discussing priority-of-use analy-
sis for resolving resource conflicts).
270 See  Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for
the Environment , 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198 (1990); see also WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T
& DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 8 (1987) (noting that the principles of sustainable
development call for “meet[ing] the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”).
271 Donna R. Christie, Marine Reserves, The Public Trust Doctrine and Intergener-
ational Equity , 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 427, 434 (2004). But see  Katryna D.
Bevis, Stopping the Silver Bullet: How Recreational Fishermen Can Use the Public
Trust Doctrine to Prevent the Creation of Marine Reserves , 13 SE. ENVTL. L. J. 171,
171 (2005).
272 Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).
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later admitted states in accord with the equal-footing doctrine.273
Scholarship on the public trust doctrine has focused largely on
how far onto land the doctrine extends,274 the boundaries of the
doctrine’s application at the shoreline, and the role and responsi-
bilities of states.
The Supreme Court applied the public trust doctrine to federal
waters in California  to reject claims by California that federal
agents had substantiated California’s ownership of submerged
lands within the territorial waters.275  This opinion suggests that
the trust responsibility of the federal government would extend
to all federal waters, but the territory in that case did not reach
beyond the three-mile belt.  Legal scholars have called attention
to the “increased role of public stewardship”276 over the EEZ
resources assumed by the federal government with the 1983
Proclamation on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the United
States of America,277 and inclusion of public trust principles into
provisions of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation Management
Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Endangered
Species Act.278  Professors Jack Archer and Casey Jarman have
urged application of the public trust doctrine to the EEZ and
suggested principles for prioritizing uses of the EEZ in line with
trust responsibilities.279  In my judgment, the public trust doc-
trine naturally extended from navigable waters and the territorial
sea to the EEZ with the expansion of U.S. sovereign rights over
this area.  The public trust doctrine applies to common property
over which the U.S. government exercises control but not owner-
273 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228-29 (1845).
274 The California courts extended the reach of the public trust doctrine to all
tributaries of navigable waters in a case involving Mono Lake where water with-
drawals were depleting lake levels.  Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d
709, 732 (Cal. 1983).
275 See supra  Part V.
276 Casey Jarman, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Exclusive Economic Zone  65
OR. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986)
277 Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (March 10, 1983).
278 See  Jarman, supra  note 276, at 18-19 (noting that the “overall purpose of the
[Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act] is consistent with steward-
ship principles”), 21 (noting that the Marine Mammals Protection Act, while not
referring to marine mammals in trust-resource terms, “describes the mammals as
‘resources of great international significance. . . .’”), & 22 (referring to the duties of
government to safeguard threatened species under the Endangered Species Act as
“akin to a trust”).
279 See Archer & Harman, supra  note 269, at 260-66.
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ship, including resources within the EEZ.280  In governing com-
mon property, in contrast to public property, the public trust
doctrine protects the interests of the actual owners (the people)
against privatization or destruction of their rights. While the fed-
eral government may use leases, permits, dedicated-access privi-
leges, and other legal instruments to determine the appropriate
uses of the EEZ, it may not fully privatize the commons or un-
dermine the interests of the wider public expressed in numerous
court cases, federal laws, and other authoritative writings regard-
ing the public trust doctrine.281
This Article does not attempt to canvas the application of the
public trust doctrine (and its related principles of stewardship,
guardianship, and the common heritage of mankind) to the
EEZs of other coastal states and the high seas.  As Peter Sand
points out, the public trust doctrine in the United States and
commonwealth countries developed from common law by judi-
cial opinions;282 thus, civil law systems have no exact parallel.283
Nonetheless, Sand makes a credible argument for extending fidu-
ciary and public trusteeship concepts internationally.284
A number of writers have advocated the extension of the pub-
lic trust concept to the international arena,285 sometimes couched
280 See  Seth Macinko, Public or Private?: United States Commercial Fisheries
Management and the Public Trust Doctrine, Reciprocal Challenges, 33 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 919, 945, 949 (1993) (linking the public trust doctrine to U.S. fisheries
management in order to protect the communal “right of fishing” (in contrast to a
“right to  fish”), urging return to “an emphasis on . . . distributional equity” that
characterized early articulations of the public trust doctrine in the United States).
281 Despite a powerful and oft-cited critique of the public trust doctrine by Profes-
sor Richard Lazarus in 1986, the doctrine has proved resilient.  Courts have contin-
ued to apply and even widen its scope. See  Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust:
The Theoretical Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Man-
agement , 31 ENVTL. L. 457, 490-91 (2001) (responding to Richard J. Lazarus, Chang-
ing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the
Public Trust Doctrine , 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986)).
282 See  Sand, supra  note 67, at 49 (tracing the roots of environmental trusteeship).
283 Peter H. Sand, Public Trusteeship for the Oceans , 4 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L.
INTELLIGENCE, Nov. 2006, at 2.
284 See  Sand, supra  note 67, at 51-54.
285 See  Ved P. Nanda & William K. Ris, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable
Approach to International Environmental Protection , 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291 (1976).
Other sources advocating such an extension include EXPERTS GROUP ON ENVTL.
LAW, WORLD COMM’N ON ENV’T & DEV., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUS-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, (1988);
Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the Elephant?,  84 AM. J. INT’L. L.
1, 34 (1990); Durwood Zaelke & James Cameron, Global Warming and Climate
Change—An Overview of the International Legal Process , 5 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
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in terms of ocean “steward[ship]” or ocean “trust.”286  As far
back as 1893, in the Fur Seal Arbitration , the United States ar-
gued that it was acting as “trustee . . . for the benefit of mankind”
in protecting living marine resources outside its territorial juris-
diction.287  In 1998, the Independent World Commission on the
Oceans, chaired by former Portuguese President Mario Soares,
recommended that “the ‘high seas’ be treated as a public trust to
be used and managed in the interests of present and future
generations.”288
Sand argues “that a transfer of the public trust concept from
the national to the global level is conceivable, feasible, and toler-
able.”289  He further states that the “public trust concept thus re-
inforces, rather than weakens, the legitimacy of environmental
governance by nation states.”290
On the high seas, which under the UNCLOS are “the common
heritage of mankind,” the members of the community include all
peoples, and states exercise a common role as trustees for the
beneficiaries, including future generations.291  Under the 1982
Convention, the International Sea-bed Authority is given the for-
249, 268 (1990); CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERGENERATIONAL TRUSTS AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION (1999); and David D. Caron, The Place of the Environ-
ment in International Tribunals , in THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES, 250 (Jay E. Austin & Carl E.
Bruch eds., 2000). Also see the extensive bibliography in Sand, supra  note 67, at 58.
286 Jon M. Van Dyke, International Governance and Stewardship of the High Seas
and its Resources , in FREEDOM FOR THE SEAS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: OCEAN GOV-
ERNANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL HARMONY 13, 19 (Jon M. Van Dyke et al. eds.,
1993); see also CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, THE GNAT IS OLDER THAN MAN: GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN AGENDA 84 (1993) (“The antidote I have been propos-
ing is a system of guardians who would be legal representatives for the natural envi-
ronment.”); ELISABETH MANN BORGESE, THE OCEANIC CIRCLE: GOVERNING THE
SEAS AS A GLOBAL RESOURCE 59-108 (1998) (discussing how the common-heritage
nature of the ocean is taking the international community closer to a concept of
ownership as trusteeship); and W. M. von Zharen, Ocean Ecosystem Stewardship , 23
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (1998) (proposing an effective steward-
ship regime).
287 Fur Seal Arbitration (Gr. Brit. v. U.S., 1893), reprinted in  1 JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH
THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY, 755, 813-14 (1898).
288 INDEP. WORLD COMM’N ON THE OCEANS, supra  note 97, at 17.
289 Sand, supra  note 67, at 57.
290 Id. at 58.
291 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 692 (1992) (treating the
high seas as an international commons for the benefit of this and future genera-
tions).  For a discussion of intergenerational equity, see REDGWELL, supra  note 285,
at 115-43.
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mal role of trustee over mineral resources of the seabed in areas
beyond coastal-state jurisdiction.292  The Continental Shelf Con-
vention of 1958 had shifted the benefits of continental-shelf re-
sources from peoples of all states to those of coastal states, and
the 1982 Convention further increased benefits from the entire
EEZ for coastal states, with some modest retained benefits for
geographically disadvantaged and landlocked states.  Still, all
states, whether parties to the 1982 Convention or not, share con-
tinued rights of navigation and the right to lay cables and pipe-
lines throughout the EEZ.  In addition to public trusteeship
principles, which may operate in the EEZ and beyond, states ex-
ercising jurisdiction and control in the EEZ have collective obli-
gations to other states and to the international community as a
whole under a variety of treaties to which they are parties.293
They also have obligations because of principles that have be-
come customary international law to manage ocean resources for
conservation, and the dual goals of sustainability and
development.294
In the case of a dispute within the United States, beneficiaries
who are part of the relevant community may have standing in
domestic courts to challenge government actions that violate
public trust principles, and state governments may bring actions
against private entities for harm to public trust assets.295  In the
international arena, beneficiaries (citizens or members of the
community) must rely on their own government to challenge ac-
tions by another government, and without explicit dispute-reso-
lution provisions, there may be no forum in which to challenge
the decisions of a trustee.  Parties to an international dispute
must agree to accept the jurisdiction of the International Tribu-
nal for the Law of the Sea or other dispute-resolution body.
First of all, this raises a classic question for “third” states wish-
ing to invoke those collective obligations: does one state have a
right under the 1982 Convention and the Statute of the Interna-
292 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the Convention, supra  note 91, 1836 U.N.T.S. at pt. I,
art. 1, and pt. XI, sec. 2, art. 137, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention _agree-
ments/texts/unclos/closindx.htm.
293 See OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra  note 6, at 445-58, tbl.29.1.
294 See supra  Part IV.B.
295 See  Kanner, supra  note 258, at 59, 100-03, 114.
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tional Court of Justice to bring an action against another state?296
For example, can a state bring an action to enforce adequate en-
vironmental protections during deep-sea vent mining in an EEZ,
or for placement of fixed facilities (e.g., an LNG terminal,
aquaculture facility, or wind farm) too close to shipping lanes?
Does one coastal state have the right to take action in a court or
another forum against another state for introducing invasive spe-
cies into its waters or for depleting a region’s tuna stocks?  And
what is the liability of a coastal state to other states and the inter-
national community at large for toxic waste dumped in the
oceans that contaminates fish and marine mammals?
Secondly, if coastal states (for their EEZs) and designated in-
ternational organizations (such as the U.N. International Seabed
Authority) have fiduciary duties to protect the resources they
hold in trust,297 it raises the question of how those trustees are to
be held accountable vis-a`-vis the ultimate beneficiaries (“peo-
ple”; i.e., civil society, at the national and international level).
What will be needed for this purpose is the development of pro-
cedural and substantive mechanisms that enable the beneficiaries
to enforce the terms of the trust or endowment against the trust-
ees.  By analogy to the mechanisms developed under the public
trust doctrine in domestic environmental law,298 there have been
a number of proposals to ensure not only representation (e.g., by
the attorney general under existing parens patriae  powers,299 or
296 See generally  K. Sachariew, State Responsibility for Multilateral Treaty Viola-
tions: Identifying the ‘Injured State’ and its Legal Status , 35 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 273
(1988) (discussing nation-states’ responsibilities to each other); see also JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPON-
SIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 302 (2002) (providing com-
mentary on Article 4: Measures Taken by States Other than an Injured State).
297 See generally  Alan E. Boyle, Remedying Harm to International Common
Spaces and Resources: Compensation and Other Approaches , in HARM TO THE EN-
VIRONMENT: THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES
83, 84 (Peter Wetterstein ed., 1997) (discussing common heritage “as a form of inter-
national trusteeship”).
298 See, e.g ., Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature & Natural Resources, Draft
International Covenant on Environment and Development  154 (3d ed., 2004) (pro-
posing that “by analogy to trusteeship rights,” interest groups with concerns about
particular environmental elements have standing).  The classic example is the Michi-
gan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, which granted a right of action to “the
attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any instrumentality or agency
of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any person, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, organization or other legal entity. . . .” MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 691.1201-1207 (West 1993) (repealed in 1994).
299 See  Kanner, supra  note 258, at 58.
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by appointment of special “guardians”300 or “high commission-
ers”301), but also for administrative and financial institutions to
ensure the optimal allocation and equitable distribution of bene-
fits generated by trust resources.  For example, the establishment
of community-based trust funds has been proposed in Nigeria302
to manage governmental revenues from Nigerian delta-oil pro-
duction, drawing on comparative experience with the Special Pe-
troleum Fund in Norway,303 the Alaska Permanent Fund,304 the
Nunavut Trust, and a revenue management plan for Chad.305
As with a charitable endowment fund, an ocean trust needs an
investment committee composed of members who understand
ecosystems and can bring scientific knowledge to bear in manag-
ing the trust assets.  Trustees should be guided by written invest-
ment policies with a precautionary investment-strategy that
encourages investment in offshore renewable-energy and
aquaculture while protecting the surrounding marine ecosystems
for this and future generations of beneficiaries.  Trustees should
not be allowed to hand over the trust corpus to private corpora-
tions (by leases or other legal contracts) without cancellation
provisions, requirements for best management practices, and
rules regarding removal of facilities and restoration of the seas-
cape at the end of a facility’s lifecycle.
300 See e.g ., INDEP. WORLD COMM’N ON THE OCEANS, supra  note 97, at 136-37,
161 (proposing an “Observatory” to independently monitor ocean affairs); STONE,
supra  note 286, at 84 (proposing various NGOs serve as guardians); MAXWELL
BRUCE & SYDNEY HOLT, A WORLD GUARDIAN FOR THE FUTURE (1977); and Phi-
lippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law , 30 HARVARD
INT’L L. J. 393, 417 (1989) (proposing a guardianship role for NGOs under interna-
tional law).
301 Institut de Droit Int’l, Responsibility and Liability Under International Law for
Environmental Damage , at 9 (Sept. 4, 1997), available at  http://www.idi-iil.org/.
302 See generally  Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Owner-
ship of Natural Resources in International Law , 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33
(2006) (proposing use of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as a benefi-
cial tool to empower) [hereinafter, Duruigbo, Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Re-
sources in International Law]; Emeka Duruigbo, Managing Oil Revenues for Socio-
Economic Development in Nigeria: The Case for Community-Based Trust Funds , 30
N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG 121 (2004) (proposing trust-fund mechanism to effec-
tively manage oil reserves) [hereinafter Duruigbo, The Case for Community-Based
Trust Funds].
303 JEFFREY DAVIS ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER 205,
STABILIZATION AND SAVINGS FUNDS FOR NONRENEWABLE RESOURCES 19 box 4.2,
23 (2001).
304 Duruigbo, The Case for Community-Based Trust Funds , supra  note 301, at
173-83.
305 Id.  at 176.
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In his 2001 book Who Owns the Sky , Peter Barnes proposed
that the United States create a Sky Trust, a type of non-profit
charitable fund into which all air polluters in the United States
would pay in proportion to their emissions of carbon dioxide.306
Beneficiaries of the Sky Trust, all current and future U.S. citi-
zens, would receive dividends from the trust.307  Many benefi-
ciaries are also polluters, but they would have an incentive to
burn less carbon in order to reduce their payments into the Sky
Trust.308  This trust concept would reward those who conserve
and reduce carbon emissions, penalize those who squander, and
distribute income to all the “owners” of the skies.309  Barnes en-
visions Congressional creation of a Sky Trust that creates carbon-
emission permits, charges market rates for those permits, and dis-
tributes the income equally.310  As with any trust, some percent-
age of the revenue stream should be returned to renew the trust
assets.311
Does this farsighted concept have an Ocean Trust equivalent—
a fund into which those who use the oceans pay for permits, and
all beneficiaries receive equal dividends?  Already, some ocean
trusts and ocean trust-funds exist, though they are neither funded
by fees from all users and polluters nor do they distribute divi-
dends to citizens.312  California’s Ocean Protection Strategy sup-
ports establishment of the National Ocean Policy Trust Fund as
recommended by the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, “but
vigorously oppose[s] any funding process that would provide in-
306 PETER BARNES, WHO OWNS THE SKY: OUR COMMON ASSETS AND THE FU-
TURE OF CAPITALISM 4 (2001).
307 Id.  at 68.
308 See id.  at 64 (since dividend is static, conservation is profitable, but waste is
not).
309 Id.
310 See id.  at 66-67 (presenting hypothetical 2010 Q-and-A explaining mechanisms
of U.S. Sky Trust).
311 For a discussion of applications of trust concepts to other commons including
air, groundwater, soil, fish, public spaces, airwaves, cyberspace, quiet, and culture,
see The State of the Commons  and other publications of Tomales Bay Institute,
available at  http://www.onthecommons.org.
312 The non-profit, non-governmental organization Ocean Trust partners with the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the fish food industry to
restore or enhance marine habitat and resources.  Ocean Trust, Restoration, http://
oceantrust.org/restoration.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2007).  It also provides research
and education.  Ocean Trust, Education, http://oceantrust.org/education.htm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2007).  In 2004, the California Legislature created the California
Ocean Protection Trust Fund to fund activities and projects authorized by the Cali-
fornia Ocean Protection Council. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 35,650 (West 2007).
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centives for new offshore oil and gas development on the outer
continental shelf.”313  The concept of providing funding for ocean
protection, research, and education from ocean-resource reve-
nues (particularly from oil and gas royalties) is not new, nor is
the notion that all citizens have a right to share equally and di-
rectly in revenues from public-trust resources.  The Alaska Per-
manent Fund distributes dividends annually to all state
residents.314  But requiring all ocean users to pay into an ocean
trust-fund and returning dividends to all the owners (members of
the community) would be a notable expansion of current
practices.
Ocean trust-funds, funded through rents and royalties, could
be used for ecosystem monitoring, tracking, and compliance.
They could also be used for environmental-, social-, and cultural-
impact studies, and resolution of conflicts among users.315  Be-
cause coastal states may not have properly exercised trust re-
sponsibilities to date, the trustees would have to grapple with
difficult questions of whether and how to restore degraded eco-
systems, remediate ocean toxic-waste dumps, and rebuild de-
pleted fish-stocks.  Would the benefits of restoration justify the
costs?  Ocean trusts could be created at state, federal, and inter-
national levels depending on which level of government has juris-
diction over the relevant resources.  Duties of trustees as well as
the community of beneficiaries would differ depending on
whether the spatial range were confined to state waters (usually
three nautical miles), the territorial sea (to twelve nautical miles),
EEZs, or the high seas.  The trust concept can be developed
through legislation and treaties as well as by broader application
of the public trust doctrine.
Both treaty obligation and customary law confirm that the
trusteeship concept does not cease at the territorial sea.  The
oceans retain their status as common property, and the public
trust concept as articulated in Roman Law and carried out
313 CAL. RES. AGENCY & CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING OUR
OCEAN: CALIFORNIA’S ACTION STRATEGY 15 (2004), available at  http://resources.ca.
gov/ocean/Cal_Ocean_Action_Strategy.pdf.  The U.S. Commission on Ocean Pol-
icy’s recommendation is in OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra  note 6, at 468-69.
314 ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.010 (West 2006).
315 See REDGWELL, supra  note 285, at 168-74; see also  Peter H. Sand, Trusts for
the Earth: New Financial Mechanisms for International Environmental Protection , in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF THE
JOSEPHINE ONOH MEMORIAL LECTURES 161 (David Freestone et al. eds., 2002) (dis-
cussing several global environmental trust funds).
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throughout domestic and international law applies to govern-
ments exercising jurisdiction over ocean commons.
VII
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: NEW
DISCOURSES FOR OCEAN MANAGEMENT
We are entering a new era of rapidly expanding ocean use
combined with increasing ability to access, study, and extract re-
sources from the deepest parts of the ocean.  New technologies
are opening new discourses on ocean ethics and governance.  Nu-
merous scientific papers document declining species, altered food
webs, polluted and degraded ecosystems, and proliferation of in-
vasive species and disease.  Climate warming and increased
storm activities heighten problems of uncertainty.  Changes in
our perceptions, values, and technology regarding the sea are
driving the need for new rules and regulations as well as changes
in systems of rights to occupy sea space and use ocean resources.
The magnitude of impact of current ocean activities on marine
physical systems requires a move from single-use and single-spe-
cies regulation to ecosystem-based management that values all
the functioning parts of an ecosystem, not only those fish and
marine mammals at the top of the trophic level that draw the
highest market-price.
We need to articulate a new discourse on sea tenure (ocean
rights and responsibilities) in the twenty-first century, a new way
to allocate ocean space and marine resources without carving the
oceans into private fiefdoms.  As demands for ocean resources
and space multiply, we need a way for private enterprise to pio-
neer wind, wave, and tidal-energy offshore as well as open-water
aquaculture.  We need new governance systems that protect the
rights of this and future generations.
In this concluding section, I offer two recommendations.  First,
governments should exercise their responsibilities as trustees by
crafting contracts that define the public trust and spell out terms
of the trusteeship to facilitate expansion of existing ocean uses,
and to accommodate new uses, while protecting the public inter-
est and fostering ecosystem-based management.  Second, govern-
ment, in partnership with private entities, should develop marine
spatial plans and comprehensive ocean zoning to deal with rising
competition for use of public trust resources throughout the
oceans.
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A. Use of Contract Law and Trusteeship Principles
Current and new uses of the seas will require a new set of rules
for managing relations between governments and private parties.
 As this Article has shown, there is no legal basis for extending
private property in the seas beyond the narrow applications cur-
rently in place adjacent to coasts.  Coastal states (and their
subunits) have limited authority to grant long-term access rights
or allow use of ocean resources within their jurisdiction.  But new
and path-breaking uses of the ocean (e.g., offshore mariculture,
renewable-energy production, and deep-sea vent mining) require
security of tenure.  Governments must be able to provide invest-
ment security and long-term guarantees of access without over-
stepping their authority.  Industry’s secure-tenure need can be
met while protecting the public trust and exercising fiduciary du-
ties to all members of the community by using contract law.  The
government should craft contracts (e.g., leases, easements, rights-
of-way, and concessions) with care to allow for periodic perform-
ance review and updating of contract terms at appropriate inter-
vals in order to incorporate new knowledge and new technology.
As with contract relations in any domain, a system of liability
rules should be in place to constrain holders of the contracts and
protect the community of owners from environmental or finan-
cial losses.  Dispute-resolution clauses should be included in all
contracts to assure methods of resolving conflict.  Contract law,
rather than property law, is the appropriate discourse through
which to deal with allocation of ocean space.
B. Marine Spatial Planning and Ocean Zoning
Increased use of ocean space produces conflicts that must be
resolved by separating incompatible uses as well as allowing for
areas of multiple, compatible uses.  Carving ocean space into pri-
vate parcels is not an attractive or viable option.  Marine spatial
planning provides a platform for resolving conflicts by determin-
ing appropriate combinations of uses and regulating ocean space
accordingly.316  The creation of networks of marine protected ar-
eas is a useful first step toward more comprehensive planning
and zoning.  The public trust and fiduciary duties of state and
federal governments over offshore areas would be well-served by
316 See generally  Crowder et al., supra  note 9 (discussing marine spatial planning).
For a discussion of marine spacial planning in Belgium, see Douvere, supra  note 24.
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comprehensive marine spatial planning and zoning that protects
the public interest in sustainable ecosystem services (e.g., safe
and sustainable seafood, clean ocean water, healthy coral reefs,
diversity of habitat, rebuilding of depleted fish-stocks, and bi-
odiversity and climate stability).  Given that extractive uses are
incompatible with many non-extractive activities and renewable-
resource uses, marine spatial plans and comprehensive zoning
could help separate incompatible uses while allocating ocean
space for renewable-energy facilities, extractive activities, trans-
port, commercial and recreational fishing, tourism, and re-
search.317  Researchers in Belgium developed specific
methodologies for spatial planning of the seas that included a
survey to determine compatible and incompatible uses of the
North Sea.318  We need to test and evaluate these spatial plan-
ning tools for use throughout EEZs.
In the United States, new uses of ocean space for renewable
energy and aquaculture, and creation of marine-protected areas,
including no-take marine reserves, require closer cooperation be-
tween state and federal agencies.  Linking renewable energy to
the electric grid requires approval by various state agencies as
well as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.  The need to
shift rapidly from fossil fuels to renewable energy will require
close collaboration among federal and state agencies.  Restruc-
turing agencies both at the federal and state level could provide
more cohesive and comprehensive planning and management of
oceans.319
Ecosystem-based management requires close collaboration of
agencies at all levels of government. Neither the federal govern-
ment nor the states can effectively manage marine systems alone.
317 See generally  Lawrence Juda & Timothy Hennessey, Governance Profiles and
the Management of the Uses of Large Marine Ecosystems , 32 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L
L. 43-69 (2001) (suggesting a matrix for identifying compatible and incompatible
uses of ocean space).
318 GAUFRE REPORT, A FLOOD OF SPACE: TOWARD A SPATIAL STRUCTURE PLAN
FOR SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF THE NORTH SEA (Frank Maes et al eds., 2005)
available at  http://www.maritieminstituut.be/main.cgi?s_id=183=&lang=en.
319 Letter from Margaret Peloso, Ph.D. Student, Nicholas Sch. of the Env’t &
Earth Sci., Duke Univ., to U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Minerals Mgmt. Serv. 26 (Feb.
28, 2006).  In her comments, Peloso outlines an idea of an Outer Continental Shelf
Resource Authority, a new agency with authority over all outer continental shelf
uses.  As she points out, this would be in line with the recommendations of the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission reports calling for
comprehensive ocean management.
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They will need much stronger and more functional cooperation
and collaboration in siting offshore facilities for wind, wave, and
tidal-energy where facilities, including transmission lines and ser-
vicing infrastructure, cross political boundaries.  They will need
closer coordination to accommodate the rapid growth in
container shipping, both to avoid conflicts with other uses at sea
and to allow for expansion of existing ports as well as construc-
tion of new ports.  Cooperation across national political-subdivi-
sions and across national boundaries will require new agreements
and restructuring organizational arrangements to facilitate devel-
opment and conservation.
In the United States, we are likely to see the evolution of the
public trust doctrine for governing ocean commons throughout
the territorial sea and EEZ.  As pressures for use expand, so
does the need to apply public trust principles, both geographi-
cally and functionally.  A clearer understanding of sea tenure
leads to the understanding of governments’ fiduciary duty to
safeguard resources for the benefit of the community, and of fu-
ture as well as the present generations.  Nation-states should rig-
orously protect the rights of all beneficiaries, i.e., all members of
the community with an interest in ocean space.  The oceans re-
main res communis , community property.  The rights of nation-
states have changed substantially in the twenty-first century with
the enclosure movement, extension of coastal state jurisdiction
over EEZs, and expanded rights to explore and exploit the sea-
bed and subsurface.  Nonetheless, nation-states exercise sover-
eign rights on behalf of all of their citizens, not only those
companies that would occupy ocean space, and develop and ex-
ploit living and non-living resources as well as renewable and fos-
sil energy.  The language of “ownership” and private property
rights has little place in the current order of the oceans.  The con-
cepts of public trust responsibilities, intergenerational equity,
ecosystem-based management, marine spatial planning, and com-
prehensive ocean zoning have emerged in a twenty-first century
discourse that is reshaping social institutions for the sea.
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